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In recent years the Supreme Court has held that peremptory
1
2
3
challenges based upon race or sex, and possibly ethnicity, violate
4
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court has yet to decide whether
religion-related peremptories also are invalid, although a number of
lower courts have struggled with the question and reached conflicting
5
conclusions. Sooner or later the Court will have to deal with the
question, and in doing so it will discover that its task is more difficult
∗
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Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
3
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991); United States v. Martinez-Salazar,
528 U.S. 304, 315 (2000) (citing Hernandez as involving “ethnic origin”). But see
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143 n.16 (suggesting Hernandez concerned race). See also Rico v.
Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 182-84 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that it was not
objectively unreasonable to apply Batson to peremptory strikes of Italian-Americans,
but affirming the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s finding that the prosecutor’s strikes
were not motivated solely by prospective jurors’ Italian-American heritage); cf.
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (implying alterable physical
characteristic—in this case long, unkempt hair and beard, suggesting lifestyle—was
not a forbidden basis for peremptory challenge).
4
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5
A number of courts have held that peremptories based on religion do not
violate the Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (allowing a peremptory challenge based on juror’s
being Jehovah’s Witness and going to church three times a week, and prosecutor’s
experience that Jehovah’s Witnesses were reluctant to exercise authority over
others); Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc)
(holding that peremptory challenges based on jurors’ being members of Pentecostal
Church did not violate the Constitution).
Other courts have held that peremptories based on religion do violate the
Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 550-56 (Conn.), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 969 (1999) (holding that peremptories based on “religious affiliation” violate
Equal Protection Clause, but noting that the challenge in question had a different
basis).
For citations to numerous other decisions on religion-related peremptories, see
Suzanne Bell Chambers, Applying the Break: Religion and the Peremptory Challenge, 70
IND. L.J. 569, 585 n.122 (1995); and Susan Hightower, Note, Sex and the Peremptory
Strike: An Empirical Analysis of J.E.B. v. Alabama’s First Five Years, 52 STAN. L. REV. 895,
901-03 (2000).
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than in cases involving race and sex, for in addition to applying equal
protection doctrine and the “impartial jury” guarantee of the Sixth
6
Amendment, it will have to take into account the Religion Clauses of
7
the First Amendment.
I.

JURY SELECTION AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES GENERALLY

In order to evaluate the arguments for and against the
constitutionality of peremptory challenges relating to religion, it is
necessary first briefly to survey generally the subject of jury selection,
including the principles that govern the formation of the venire and
challenges for cause, as well as peremptory challenges. Only with this
wide focus will it be possible to appreciate the special questions
presented by the application of the Religion Clauses to the use of
peremptory challenges.
If trial by jury is employed in the prosecution of crime, which
constitutionally it must be if the prosecution is for more than a petty
8
offense, the jury must be randomly selected from a venire that is a
fair cross-section of the population. The requirement that the venire
be a fair cross-section is found in the Sixth Amendment’s provision
9
that a criminal defendant is entitled to trial by an “impartial jury.”
The Supreme Court has said that “jury wheels, pools of names,
panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically
exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be
10
reasonably representative thereof.” It may not matter for present
purposes whether the Court means to lay down an absolute right to a
fair cross-section in each and every venire, or only that a departure
11
from the fair cross-section must not be intentional.
6

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
7
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
8
Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 325 (1996) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
9
The present discussion is confined to criminal cases, and therefore I refer only
to the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Amendment also provides for “the right of
trial by jury,” U.S. CONST. amend. VII, but this requirement has not been applied to
the states. See Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973). Article III, § 2, cl. 3 of the
original Constitution requires that in federal courts “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except
in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
10
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 366 (1979).
11
See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 184-85 (1989)
(examining the difference between “systematic” and “purposeful” exclusion); Joanna
Sobol, Note, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Impairment of the “Fair
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What makes a venire a fair cross-section for Sixth Amendment
purposes is that it be composed of representatives of “cognizable
groups” in numbers proportional to their numbers in the population.
“Cognizable groups” are groups that have shared beliefs about the
way the world works—beliefs about facts—or shared beliefs about
how the world ought to work—beliefs about the good or values. In
addition, for a group to be “cognizable” for Sixth Amendment
12
purposes, it must be of a certain size. In regard to factual beliefs, if
the group that holds these beliefs is very small, the beliefs, if they are
to affect the outcome of litigation, must be introduced through the
formal trial process of sworn and cross-examined witnesses,
authenticated documents and so on, and not through the informal
process of “jury notice,” i.e., the jurors simply taking into account
what they think they already know. The requirement that a group be
of a certain size to be cognizable is based upon the need of fair notice
to the parties of the basis upon which the verdict will rest, and reflects
the weakness of the political claims of small groups in the society,
under the fundamental constitutional philosophy, to have their
13
beliefs automatically taken into account. In regard to beliefs about
the good, it may be that there is no way for a small group to influence
the outcomes of a jury system. A small belief group is not a
“cognizable group,” entitled to representation on the venire with a
consequent chance to be included in the petty jury, and so to
influence the verdict through the informal process, nor is it entitled
to put its beliefs about the good before the jury through the formal
process. The jury generally will receive the law from the judge, a law
that usually will reflect the values of large or at least mid-size groups
in the population, whether it has been enacted by the legislature or
created by the courts. In the limited instances in which the jury is
given the task of deciding what is good and not simply what
occurred—e.g., whether conduct was negligent, or in certain criminal
cases, what the punishment should be—evidence ordinarily will not
be received on questions of value. If small belief groups, so far as
values are concerned, are to affect the outcomes of cases tried to
juries, they must become large groups, so that they can influence the
content of the law enacted by the legislature or announced by the
judges, or so that they can be recognized as “cognizable groups”
entitled to representation on venires with a chance for their members
Cross-Section of the Community”, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 195-96 (1995) (discussing
“systematic exclusion”).
12
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 134 (requiring “identifiable segments playing major roles
in the community”); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
13
See John H. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395, 399-401 (1985).
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to be on petty juries.
Challenges “for cause” assure that there are not on the petty jury
representatives of groups that are noncognizable in regard either to
facts or to values, or at least that there are not on the jury
representatives of such groups who present more than a certain risk
that they will resort to impermissible beliefs. Challenges for cause
may be seen as not in conflict with the fair cross-section requirement
of the Sixth Amendment, but a means for enforcing it, at least
assuming a certain standard for “cause.” Thus, to say that a
defendant has a right to a petty jury that is randomly drawn from a
fair cross-section of the population, properly understood, means that
the petty jury is randomly drawn from a fair cross-section of
cognizable groups, that is to say from the qualified population.
“Cognizable groups” does not include small belief groups, persons
under a certain age, or persons who lack a certain physical and
intellectual capacity. It does not matter whether the unqualified are
excluded at the threshold of the selection process, at a later stage, or
when the petty jury is finally chosen from the venire. The method
that is used may affect whether a particular individual sits on a jury,
but it will not affect the representation of cognizable groups.
The foregoing analysis sees the Sixth Amendment’s “impartial
jury” guarantee as containing a single requirement of random
selection from a fair cross-section of cognizable groups, so that
challenges for cause simply enforce that single requirement. An
alternative view is that the requirement of an “impartial jury” contains
two norms, the first being the requirement of random selection from
a fair cross-section, the second, that no one sit on a petty jury whose
presence creates a significant risk that the verdict will depend upon a
belief not held by a cognizable group. Under the second approach,
challenges for cause are to enforce the second norm contained
14
within the requirement of an impartial jury.
The notion of excluding a person for cause because of a risk of
juror “misconduct” does not state a different idea. The misconduct
in question may be the employment of beliefs, whether about facts or
values, that are not permitted to be used by jurors because of the
decision just referred to, which restricts the use of background
knowledge to that possessed by cognizable groups. In order to justify
exclusion for cause, it need not be certain that a prospective juror
will employ prohibited beliefs; there need only be a certain
likelihood that this will occur. It is the law of challenges for cause
14

See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-36 (1992) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment and due process may require a juror to be removed for cause).
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that determines what risk requires exclusion. At the same time, a
party may be injured by an incorrect exclusion, because it will deprive
him of a juror who was randomly selected from a fair cross-section of
the population and who might well have limited himself to
permissible background beliefs.
As already noted, in addition to the ordinary law of cause, there
is a constitutional standard in the “impartial jury” requirement of the
Sixth Amendment against which dismissals of jurors in criminal cases
must be measured. In a line of cases involving the jury’s role in
deciding whether capital punishment should be applied, the
Supreme Court has held that although it is proper to dismiss from
the jury persons whose opposition to capital punishment would
substantially impair their ability to apply the law and weigh the
evidence, it violates the Sixth Amendment and possibly the Due
Process Clause to sustain challenges against persons who merely
harbor doubts about capital punishment. To exclude these persons
when there is only some risk that they will allow themselves to be
governed by impermissible views, violates the defendant’s right to the
results of random selection from a representative cross-section of
15
cognizable groups.
An unanswered question relevant to this discussion is the status
of per se rules adopted by legislatures or courts to exclude for cause
16
all those who have a certain characteristic. For example, drawing
upon a recent case against tobacco companies that involved questions
17
of both liability and damages, suppose the court excluded from the
jury all those who belonged to the immediate family of a smoker who
was a member of the class of plaintiffs that sought recovery, or all
those who had a certain relationship by blood or marriage to such a
18
smoker. By way of further example, in a prosecution in 1950 of the
Secretary of the American Communist Party for contempt of
Congress, the defendant at trial sought to have excluded for cause all
19
federal employees.
Since the prosecution was in the District of
Columbia, this would have included a substantial percentage of the

15

Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 414-16 (1987); Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 595-97 (1978); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
16
See Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 545, 549 n.16 (1975) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887) (detailing
typical reasons for exclusion for cause)).
17
Scott v. Am. Tobacco Co., 814 So. 2d 544 (La. 2002).
18
In Scott, the court found error in the trial court’s refusal to exclude certain
family members for cause, but not in its refusal to exclude others. Id.
19
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 164-65 (1950).
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population. On appeal, the defendant called to the Supreme Court’s
attention an Executive Order requiring that the loyalty of all
government employees be assured by their superiors. The Court
held, nevertheless, that the Sixth Amendment’s provision for an
20
impartial jury did not require the exclusion of this class of persons.
The alternative to a per se rule is to consider all the information
available about a prospective juror and then to apply a burden of
proof rule relating to the risk of misconduct. Such a rule would
embody a judgment about how bad it is for a juror to use
impermissible beliefs compared to how bad it is to prevent the use of
permissible beliefs. Thus, a per se rule might reflect a legislature’s or
court’s decision not to leave it to individual judges to make
particularized determinations on this matter. A defendant may
complain that the ordinary law of cause or the Sixth Amendment
entitle him to just such a particularized judgment, or he may claim
the opposite, that they entitle him to the application of a per se rule
to keep off the jury all persons who have a certain characteristic that
21
creates a certain risk of misconduct.
Here we may speak of another aspect of jury selection that has
22
perplexed some courts. In view of the concern that the venire be a
fair cross-section of the population, presumably because of the
consequences for the composition of the petty jury, why is not the
petty jury itself required to be a fair cross-section? In a recent case
involving a violent conflict between elements of the Jewish and Black
communities in Brooklyn, the trial judge attempted to create a petty
23
jury that would represent the affected groups.
His efforts were
24
repudiated by the court of appeals. We have just seen that there is
concern with the composition of the petty jury in that persons who
are members of noncognizable groups and who pose a certain risk of
misconduct may or must be excluded for cause. But keeping such
persons off the jury is quite different from making sure that there are
on the jury representatives of all the groups whose beliefs may
20

Id. at 172; see also United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (in prosecution for conspiracy to deprive Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews of
constitutional rights, holding that it was not error to refuse to strike for cause all
Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews); Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951, 953-54 (D.C.
1977) (in prosecution for holdup of priests in Catholic rectory, holding that it was
not error to refuse to exclude for cause all Catholics).
21
See United States v. Ferri, 778 F.3d 985, 992-93 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing
“implied bias”).
22
See, e.g., State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1160 (N.J. 1986).
23
United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 172 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 835
(2002).
24
Id. at 213.
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properly influence verdicts and in proportions that reflect their size
in the population. Since the jury is limited to twelve persons, in
order to comply with the suggested standard, only the very largest
cognizable groups could be represented on the petty jury. Excluded
would be not only small groups whose beliefs ought not to affect
verdicts through “jury notice,” but even mid-size groups as well,
against the use of whose beliefs by way of jury notice there cannot be
a valid objection on the basis of lack of fair notice to the parties or of
entitlement under the basic political philosophy.
Under the
prevailing system, although it may turn out that there are in fact no
representatives of some or any mid-size belief groups on a particular
jury, such groups do have a chance to have representation on petty
juries, because selection is at random from a large venire that is a fair
cross-section of all large and mid-size groups. Complete exclusion of
mid-size groups from petty juries would have a significant effect on
verdicts and also on the excluded groups. As will be appreciated, the
policy underlying jury trial has something in common with
proportional representation.
Returning to challenges for cause and their relation to a party’s
right to random selection from a venire that is a fair cross-section of
cognizable groups, it is necessary to distinguish between exclusion
from the jury for reasons intrinsic to its proper functioning—for
instance that there is a certain risk of juror misconduct—and
exclusion for extrinsic policy reasons. In the latter category would be
rules of disqualification of those who hold certain public offices or
who perform functions deemed essential to the community, such as
25
police or members of the Armed Forces. In the case of extrinsic
policy, exclusion is not for the sake of the jury system, but to protect
another important activity, either because the excluded class must be
available for that activity or because engaging in jury service will in
some way render the members of the class less effective in the
performance of the other activity. The extrinsic policy may be
deemed adequately served not by a flat exclusion, but by making
available to the persons in the class concerned an excuse from jury
service, leaving it to individuals to decide whether their other
26
obligation would be compromised.
In the case of some exclusions, both intrinsic and extrinsic
objectives are served: If persons in the excluded class served as jurors,
25

See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532-35; Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906)
(stating that “for the good of the community . . . their regular work should not be
interrupted”).
26
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 362 n.10, 367-69.
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they might not be effective jurors because of their concern about
their other responsibilities. The excluded or excused group may or
may not be a cognizable group for fair cross-section purposes. It may
be a group for purposes of the extrinsic policy—e.g., doctors or
parents of young children—but not so far as concerns distinctive
beliefs about the world or values. Or perhaps although the group
may have distinctive beliefs, it may not be large enough to be
27
cognizable.
28
Taylor v. Louisiana, a case that involved a state law that excluded
women from jury service unless they had filed a consent to be subject
to it, combined all the aforementioned characteristics. Women, the
Supreme Court held, were a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment
purposes because, speaking generally, they had different factual
beliefs and values than men and constituted over half the population.
Allowing them to be excluded meant that venires would not be a fair
cross-section of the population of cognizable groups for Sixth
Amendment purposes. The state law excluding women could have
served the extrinsic policy of encouraging women to devote
themselves to their traditional functions in the domestic sphere and
to stay out of a contentious public arena, but the Supreme Court
refused to accept this policy as having sufficient importance to
outweigh the fair cross-section value. Excluding women could have
been for intrinsic reasons as well—women, it might have been
thought, generally do not have the attributes necessary to be effective
jurors—but if this was a reason for the state law, the Supreme Court
either rejected its factual premise or, as in the case of the extrinsic
policy, found it insufficient to justify depriving the defendant of a
venire that was a fair cross-section. As will be seen below, the Court’s
insistence that women are a cognizable group with distinctive beliefs
is in conflict with the reasoning, shortly to be discussed, that the
Court uses to support its conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause
is violated by the use of a peremptory challenge to a juror based on
29
sex.
30
A case to be discussed later, McDaniel v. Paty, involving the
exclusion of ministers of religion from the legislature, resembles
Taylor in its structure, with both intrinsic and extrinsic policies to be
considered, but implicates not only the Religion Clauses of the First
27

For an indication of the importance of size, see id. at 369-70, and Taylor, 419
U.S. at 531.
28
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
29
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 157 (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra note 48 and
accompanying text.
30
435 U.S. 618 (1978); see infra note 125.
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Amendment, but also the Sixth Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause.
To the foregoing discussion of jury selection, especially the Sixth
Amendment requirement of a fair cross-section of the population
and challenges for cause, must now be added considerations flowing
from the Equal Protection Clause, especially its policy of special
protection for suspect classes, groups in regard to which there has
been a history of invidious discrimination. Invidiousness may involve
elements of hatred, repugnance, fear, or inferiority. As a result of
these feelings, and perhaps because of its size, the suspect class may
be relatively powerless to protect itself through the ordinary political
process. A group cognizable for Sixth Amendment purposes,
constituted as such by its distinctive beliefs and size, may have no
claim to be a specially protected class for equal protection purposes.
A Sixth Amendment cognizable group may not be subject to
invidious discrimination, and a specially protected group for equal
protection purposes may have no distinctive beliefs or be too small to
constitute a Sixth Amendment cognizable group. The two ideas are
constructed for entirely different purposes. On the other hand, these
two sorts of groups may coincide: An ethnic or national-origin or
racial group—or a religious group—may be both a cognizable belief
group and, perhaps in part because of its distinctive beliefs, subject to
31
invidious discrimination and so a suspect class.
There may be a conflict between the policy of the Sixth
Amendment and that of the Equal Protection Clause. Suppose a
prospective juror is a member of a distinctive belief group, but it is
not a cognizable group because in the jurisdiction in which the court
sits, the group—assume it is a racial-ethnic group like the Hmong
from Southeast Asia—is not large enough. Because there is a certain
risk of juror misconduct in the form of a member of the group
employing knowledge as a juror that ought only to influence the
verdict if introduced through the formal process, a challenge for
cause is made. Assume that if only the Sixth Amendment is taken
into account—the risk of misconduct—the challenge would be
sustained. This ruling would enforce only the fair cross-section
policy. But suppose the racial-ethnic group to which the prospective
juror belongs is also a suspect class subject to invidious
discrimination. In some cases perhaps it can be argued that
exclusion of the juror will not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because if the probability of misconduct is high enough to warrant
31

See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977) (holding that MexicanAmericans are a “distinct class” for equal protection purposes).
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exclusion for cause, there will be no invidiousness implied by
exclusion. But if the challenge for cause is rejected because of
injurious consequences to the excluded juror and his group, or
because of some supposed injury to the trial process itself or to the
judicial system as a consequence of exclusion, then the policy of the
Sixth Amendment would be subordinated to that of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Another case can be imagined.
Suppose an accused is
prosecuted for the murder of a Korean grocer and in the course of
jury selection seeks to exclude all Koreans for cause. Possibly
Koreans would be a distinctive belief group for Sixth Amendment
purposes, possessing attitudes and ideas different from other racialethnic groups, but they are not numerous enough in the jurisdiction
to qualify for Sixth Amendment purposes. Defendant claims that
there is a serious risk that Korean jurors will use their distinctive but
impermissible background beliefs, and that because of this risk, his
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury would be violated by
allowing them to serve. He also claims that because of their
identification with the victim, there is an additional risk that Korean
jurors will ignore the law and the evidence in determining their
verdict. Koreans may also be a specially protected class for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause. This is not necessarily because of
their distinctive beliefs nor because of their size, but because they
have been subjected to invidious discrimination. If, as in the case of
the Hmong, a challenge for cause is rejected, this represents a
determination that the evil of reinforcing invidious discrimination
32
outweighs the defendant’s interests under the Sixth Amendment.
33
If we return to the Taylor case, discussed above, this time taking
into account the Equal Protection Clause, we can see that the result
in that case—striking down the exemption of women—did not
sacrifice the Sixth Amendment to the Equal Protection Clause, nor
the reverse. The decision upheld both: it avoided any invidiousness
that the absence of women on the venire and the petty jury might
have implied, and it assured to defendant the result of random
selection from a cross-section to which he was entitled under the
32

An example of equal protection concerns being held to outweigh the interests
of the parties or Sixth Amendment rights may be found in cases rejecting challenges
for cause to deaf jurors, and even peremptory challenges, though here the
“misconduct” of which there is a risk is not the application of impermissible beliefs,
but the inability to perceive evidence. People v. Guzman, 555 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y.
1990) (challenge for cause); People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Westchester County
Ct. 1990) (peremptory).
33
See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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Sixth Amendment. The only policy rejected, at least when given such
broad protection as the exemption made available to all women, was
the extrinsic policy that excluded women in order to protect their
traditional role. Of course it must be kept in mind that the fact that
the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause call for the
same result is purely coincidental, because they proceed on different
rationales. Indeed, the rationale that was to the fore in Taylor—that
women have distinctive beliefs—is, as we will see, largely repudiated
34
in the later case of J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., involving peremptory
challenges and the Equal Protection Clause.
In the case of Blacks also, there ordinarily will not be a conflict
between the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.
Would Blacks be a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment purposes?
Even if Blacks are sufficiently numerous, the Supreme Court would
be most reluctant to ascribe to them distinctive beliefs and values,
because this would openly collide with the attitudes it seeks to
promote in its equal protection jurisprudence. Thus there is no
equivalent to the Taylor decision in the case of Blacks. In any event,
even if both the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
are relevant in the case of Blacks, both clauses point in the same
direction: A challenge for cause simply on the basis that a juror is
Black should not be sustained.
Finally, a short digression may be permitted to consider
disqualification of voters, which may be analogous to disqualification
of jurors for cause. Familiar grounds for disqualification of voters
would be alienage, minority, conviction of felony, or mental
35
incompetence. These grounds of disqualification are ordinarily the
result of constitutional or statutory provisions and not of judge-made
law. They are in the nature of per se rules, and do not provide for
individualized determinations, which often are undertaken in the
case of challenges for cause to jurors. Most of the grounds of
disqualification of voters are concerned with the quality of the
electoral process—excluding classes of persons unlikely to have the
intelligence, information, or values necessary to make a useful
political contribution. Other grounds for exclusion may have more
subtle purposes, such as to exclude those considered not part of the
political community or to punish persons who have attacked its basic
values.
34

511 U.S. 127 (1994).
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1001.02 (2)(A) (alien); (2)(B) (age); (2)(C)
(mentally incompetent); (7)(A) (convicted of felony) (2001 & Supp. 2003);
Sherman v. United States, 155 U.S. 673 (1895).
35
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If, as noted earlier, the task of jurors is mainly to make
determinations of fact, in the case of voters it is the opposite, to make
determinations of value. Of course, determinations of value will, to
an extent, be premised upon determinations of fact. Neither in
regard to facts nor values are voters restricted to employing beliefs
held by a group of a certain size in the population. As has been
suggested, jurors are limited to the fact and value beliefs held by
some group of substantial size, unless the beliefs are introduced
through the formal process of proof. Thus in the case of voters,
there is nothing analogous to the idea of a “cognizable group” found
in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, nor is there random selection
from a fair cross-section. The voter votes as an individual, all
qualified individuals may vote, and every voter may rely on whatever
fact and value opinions he has. Thus, the only misconduct that need
be considered in the case of voting, not already provided for by the
36
per se rules of disqualification, would be bribery or coercion.
The statement just made that there are no restrictions imposed
upon the information and values voters may apply may have to be
qualified by limitations coming from the Equal Protection Clause. If
it is unconstitutional for a jury to render a verdict not capable of
justification except by reference to an animus toward a suspect class,
it would similarly be unconstitutional for the voters to be thus
37
motivated.
Both the jurors and the voters exercise state power.
Whether there are additional restrictions imposed on jurors and
voters by the Religion Clauses will be considered in due course.
We come now to the question of peremptory challenges, and in
the first place whether their allowance conflicts with the Sixth
Amendment right to an “impartial jury.” If the Sixth Amendment
right is understood to guarantee that the petty jury will be a body of
persons that is exclusively the result of random selection from a fair
cross-section, by definition there is a conflict. If a peremptory
challenge removes a person who is a member of a cognizable group
in respect to factual beliefs or values, perhaps precisely because he is
a member of such a group, it interferes with the operation of the laws
of chance that otherwise might have placed that person on the petty
jury. But to find a violation of the Sixth Amendment in these
circumstances would be an unreasonable interpretation of the

36

See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982) (bribery); see also 42 U.S.C. §
1973i (2000) (coercion).
37
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1995) (holding that state constitutional
amendment adopted by referendum was “born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected”).
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Amendment in view of the fact that at the time the Amendment was
adopted, the use of peremptories was well established, and there is no
38
reason to think the Framers intended to abolish the practice. The
Sixth Amendment, in assuring a venire that is a fair cross-section and
requiring exclusion from the petty jury of persons challengeable for
cause because of a risk of misconduct, has achieved its purpose even
though the jury may be further narrowed by the parties’ removing
those who, although members of cognizable groups, are at one
39
extreme or the other of the venire. This conclusion is supported by
Justice O’Connor’s view in the capital punishment cases, referred to
above, that although it is not permissible to exclude for cause a
person who merely has doubts about capital punishment, it is
40
permissible to exclude such a person by a peremptory challenge.
What do peremptory challenges do? Challenges for cause, as we
have seen, remove those who pose a certain risk of misconduct,
especially the misconduct of going beyond the bounds of permissible
beliefs in regard to either facts or values. These challenges can be
seen as simply enforcing the Sixth Amendment policy. But a juror
may still pose some risk of misconduct, even though not sufficient to
warrant removal for cause. The parties may use their limited number
of peremptories to remove jurors who pose this lower, although not
insignificant, risk. Some may argue that this use of peremptories will
help bring about a truly impartial jury, but this is not an impartial
jury in the sense required by the Sixth Amendment. In addition to
eliminating a risk of misconduct, the parties may remove through
peremptories persons who pose no risk of misconduct, since they will
employ beliefs entirely within the permitted range, but who in the
judgment of the parties simply would be unfavorable to them. There
is nothing objectionable about providing this opportunity for the
operation of self-interest. Indeed, allowing the parties to participate
in this way, without even a demand for rationality—though doubtless
they will have their reasons—may make verdicts more acceptable to
41
those directly affected and to the public.
38

See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
39
See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478-80 (1990).
40
Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari); see also State v. Bolton, 896 P.2d 830, 842 (Ariz. 1995).
41
See Holland, 493 U.S. at 480 (“But it [the fair cross-section value] has never
included the notion that, in the process of drawing the jury, that initial
representativeness cannot be diminished by allowing both the accused and the State
to eliminate persons thought to be inclined against their interests . . . .”); see also
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Holland and referring to
“[o]ur belief that experienced lawyers will often correctly intuit which jurors are
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42

In Batson v. Kentucky, peremptory challenges based on race, and
43
in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., peremptory challenges based on sex,
were held unconstitutional. If peremptory challenges generally do
not violate the Sixth Amendment, neither do peremptory challenges
based on race or sex. A racial group may or may not be a cognizable
group for Sixth Amendment purposes. As noted above, Taylor v.
44
Louisiana held that men and women are cognizable groups. If a
group is not a cognizable group, elimination of one of their members
by a peremptory challenge has no significance from a Sixth
Amendment perspective. Even if a group is a cognizable group,
elimination of one of its members by a peremptory challenge is not a
violation of the Sixth Amendment for the reason stated above—that
this would be an unreasonable interpretation of the Framers’ intent
in historical context. Thus, it is the Equal Protection Clause alone,
and not the Sixth Amendment, that is violated by peremptory
challenges based on race or sex. Early in the use of the Equal
Protection Clause to prohibit peremptories based on race, it was
suggested that it was the right of the party opposed to the challenge,
or a combination of his right and that of the excluded juror, that was
45
violated. Later cases have emphasized the right of the juror not to
46
be excluded.
The justification for finding peremptory challenges based on
race or sex in conflict with the Equal Protection Clause may be that
the Court disagrees with the factual premises upon which such
challenges are based. The Court may reject entirely the idea that
different races or the two sexes have different beliefs, or it may
disagree with the importance that the peremptory implicitly attaches

likely to be the least sympathetic”); id. at 160-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
adversarial trial strategies, such as peremptories, should be judged within the system
as a whole); Babcock, supra note 16, at 551; Chambers, supra note 5, at 575-76;
Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It,
Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 771-72 (1992); Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching
the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517, 559 (1992).
But see United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316 (2000) (noting “a
principal reason for peremptories: to help secure the constitutional guarantee of
trial by an impartial jury”); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 n.8 (“The only legitimate interest it
[a party] could possibly have in the exercise of its peremptory challenges is securing
a fair and impartial jury.”). Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992), recognizes
that the role of litigants in determining jury composition provides one reason for
wide acceptance of verdicts.
42
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
43
511 U.S. 127 (1994).
44
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
45
Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
46
E.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140, 142 n.13; McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48-49.
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to the fact of race or sex. On the other hand, the Court may not
disagree with the premises, but judge that even if they are correct,
these facts—the difference in ideas between the races or sexes—are
social constructs, and bad ones at that, because they have pernicious
effects on individuals and groups. Even if the differences are facts of
nature, the Court may think that they are unhappy facts and should
not be reinforced by legal recognition, including through the use of
peremptory challenges premised on these facts. As to the first
suggested justification, it would be unusual for a court to deny a
peremptory challenge simply because it disagreed with the opinion
or hunch on which it is based—indeed that would be inconsistent
with the argument in favor of the usefulness of peremptories. As to
the second suggested justification, in the case of sex it is in obvious
conflict with the Taylor case, where the Court expressly relied upon its
view that men and women have different beliefs, in reaching the
conclusion that each sex is a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment
purposes. The Court neither condemned the idea that a difference
47
exists nor suggested that the difference produced evil consequences.
But in J.E.B., the Court took the view that the treatment of women
over a long period of time, including their complete exclusion from
juries, had been invidious, and that this historical background
conferred invidiousness on present-day use of peremptories against
women. It remains something of a mystery how this reasoning leads
to the further conclusion that peremptories used against men are
also infected with invidiousness, though this was in fact the situation
48
involved in J.E.B.
It has long been held that there is no constitutional right to
peremptories either in the Sixth Amendment or anywhere else in the
49
Constitution. The only question is whether the Equal Protection
Clause forbids their use in certain situations. If a peremptory
47

419 U.S. 522 (1975); see J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 139 n.11 (“Even if a measure of truth
can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used to justify gender-based
peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support discrimination on the basis of
gender in jury selection.”); id. at 149 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]o say that
gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not to say that gender makes no
difference as a matter of fact.”); id. at 157 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting conflict with
Taylor v. Louisiana); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1051 n.5 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“Without denying the possibility that race . . . makes a difference in jury
decisionmaking . . . it seems to me that the better course is to ensure a fair shake by
denying each side the right to make race-based selections. The cost of the alternative
is simply too great.”); Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 942 (1986) (O’Connor,
J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[Batson] is a special rule of relevance, a
statement about what this Nation stands for, rather than a statement of fact.”).
48
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 156 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49
See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988).
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challenge otherwise allowable is denied because of the ground on
which it is based, the cost falls on the challenging party in respect to
the benefits that peremptories confer: eliminating jurors who pose
some risk of misconduct; eliminating jurors the parties think not
favorably disposed towards them; and allowing the parties to
participate in the construction of the tribunal that is to judge them.
It is important not to exaggerate the effect of eliminating
peremptories based on race and sex. If the probabilities of juror
misconduct rise above a certain level, there will be available a
challenge for cause or a challenge based upon that aspect of the
Sixth Amendment’s requirement of an impartial jury that limits the
50
effects of random selection. If a juror is excused for cause when
race or sex plays some part in bringing the probabilities of
misconduct to a dangerous level, there may be, as in the case of
peremptories, some possibility of injury to the dismissed juror and
the class he represents. But because of the high likelihood of
misconduct, as suggested earlier, few would see this exclusion as
invidious. The Court has indicated that if a peremptory is based
upon some circumstance other than sex or race, the mere fact that it
has a disparate impact on one sex or a race will not cause a violation
51
of the Equal Protection Clause.
Batson held that the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment was satisfied by the fact that the peremptory challenge
there in question had been exercised by the prosecutor, acting for
52
the state. Subsequent to that decision, it was held that the stateaction requirement is also satisfied when the challenge is made by a
53
54
party to a civil case and even by a criminal defendant. The result in
the last situation—deeming the criminal defendant to be exercising
state power even though the state is pursuing him and he is doing
55
everything in his power to escape—is more or less fantastic. Even in
the case of civil parties, to hold that they fall within the purposes of
the state-action requirement of the Equal Protection Clause when
they make peremptory challenges, loses sight of the justification for
50

See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. For a discussion of situations in
which the Sixth Amendment requires exclusion, see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
221 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
51
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143.
52
Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
53
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
54
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59.
55
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 150 (O’Connor, J., concurring); McCollum, 505 U.S. at 6263 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant’s
Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 808 (1989).
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peremptories in allowing the parties to pursue within certain limits
their own interests, in the hope that this will win acceptance of
verdicts. If in exercising peremptories, the parties are state actors,
why are they not state actors when they offer evidence or make
56
argument? A few courts indeed have adopted this extension and
forbidden evidence to be introduced when it concerns the attitude or
57
behavior of members of an ethnic group. Apparently, these courts
judge that the collateral social damage from the parties’ introducing
such evidence and jurors’ drawing inferences based on ethnic or
racial generalizations, even though they may be correct, outweighs
58
the importance of allowing relevant evidence to be considered.
Although the selection of evidence to be introduced is made by the
party, not by the state, with the law making a contribution only in that
it allows the evidence to be put before the trier, the limitations of the
Equal Protection Clause are to be enforced. So far as peremptory
challenges are concerned, those based on race or sex violate the
Equal Protection Clause no matter what party makes them, and
evidently this is settled law. Possibly it can be argued that there is less
reason to see the state-action requirement of the Equal Protection
Clause satisfied in the case of peremptories than in the case of
introducing evidence, since in the former, the only effect is the
absence on the jury of an individual who otherwise would be there,
whereas with the latter, a basis is provided upon which the jury—
clearly an organ of the state—rests its verdict.
II. THE RELIGION CLAUSES GENERALLY
In order to answer the questions presented by peremptory
challenges relating to religion, it is necessary briefly to consider in
56

Justice Scalia asked this question in his dissent in J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 163.
E.g., United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1211-13 (8th Cir. 1994).
58
In Jinro America, Inc. v. Secure Investments, Inc., 266 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2001), the
court held it error to allow an expert to testify to the practice of Korean businesses to
engage in fraud and corruption, this practice being suggested to have probative
value as to whether a certain transaction engaged in by plaintiff, a Korean company,
was a sham. The holding was based, not upon constitutional considerations, but in
part at least on Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which requires that evidence be
excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. But the court did not make clear whether the error lay
simply in the evidence’s use of “ethnic or cultural stereotyping,” or in the likelihood
that the stereotype would cause the jury to return a verdict based on disgust, fear, or
hostility. Jinro, 266 F.3d at 1007-08. The court’s opinion reviews many other cases
involving evidence of ethnic group characteristics. See also United States v. Cabrera,
222 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that both Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and
due process were violated by allowing detective to testify in drug prosecution to drug
habits of Cubans).
57
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addition to the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause,
the general law of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
Both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause must be
considered: the first because the exclusion of a juror on account of
his religion may burden the exercise of his religion; the second
because the standards for permissible government action under that
clause—action that includes the exercise of power by juries—may
give reason to exclude from juries persons likely to disregard them,
and also because forbidding the exercise of peremptory challenges
based upon religion may provide a degree of support for religion not
permitted by the Establishment Clause.
As is well known, the Free Exercise Clause is currently the site of
a struggle between two sharply opposed views concerning the rights
of conscience and the limits of the ordinary political process, between
what may be referred to as the Sherbert-Yoder reading of the Free
59
60
Exercise Clause and the Smith reading of that clause.
Under
Sherbert-Yoder, if government action burdens the practice of a person’s
religion, the burden being judged such from a secular and not from a
religious point of view, even though there may be a secular purpose
to the government action, the imposition of the burden must be
justified by a compelling state interest that is promoted by the least
intrusive means. As applied in the Sherbert case itself, this meant that
a Seventh Day Adventist who could not find a job because her
religion prevented her from working on Saturday was required to be
given unemployment compensation even though the state’s
unemployment program did not allow it in the circumstances; and in
the Yoder case, that Amish parents could not be compelled by the
criminal law to send their children to school past the eighth grade
when their religion forbade it. Under the Smith approach, if the
burden on religion is the result of a “neutral, generally applicable
law”—such as that all children must attend school until the age of
sixteen—that is the end of any claim under the Free Exercise Clause,
no matter how heavy the burden on the practice of religion or the
61
slightness of the state interest advanced by the law.
Whether the Smith rule is established beyond reconsideration is
not entirely clear. The rule announced in Smith arguably was dictum,
59

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1961).
60
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
61
Id. at 880. In fact in the Smith case, as will be mentioned shortly, an exception
was articulated for the situation presented by Yoder of Amish parents being unwilling
to send their children to school past the eighth grade. See infra note 72 and
accompanying text.
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uttered without benefit of briefs or oral argument on the question
involved. It was reexamined in Church of the Lukumi Babalu, Inc. v.
62
City of Hialeah, in which it was found in fact not to apply. Four years
63
later the rule was reiterated in City of Boerne v. Flores, in which,
although there was an extensive review of historical materials relevant
to the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and a rejection of
Congress’s power to alter the Smith rule and restore Sherbert-Yoder,
there was no actual application of Smith to the case at hand. The
dissenters to the decision in Smith continue to insist that it is an
incorrect reading of the Free Exercise Clause and that under the
circumstances stare decisis should not be seen as an obstacle to
64
repudiating it.
The Smith rule, in spite of the seemingly clear statement of it set
forth above, is in fact very unclear. This unclarity leaves the way open
for a minimalist interpretation that would permit the Sherbert-Yoder
rule to continue to apply in a large number of situations. Indeed, the
unclarity of the Smith rule could allow for its almost complete
elimination at the hands of perplexed or determined lower courts,
65
and some have already set about this task.
A plurality of the
Supreme Court holds the view that the Smith rule involves two distinct
ideas: “neutral” and “generally applicable.” For the plurality,
“neutral” refers to the fact that a law is reasonably capable of
justification on a secular ground—e.g., in the case of a prohibition on
the use of peyote, the situation involved in Smith, the protection of
health—and also, perhaps, that the legislature was actually motivated
66
by that reason. “Generally applicable” refers to the purpose of the
67
law as determined from the text itself and from its administration.
Other Justices believe that “neutral” and “generally applicable” mean
68
substantially the same thing.
69
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Court struck down
under the Free Exercise Clause city ordinances prohibiting animal
62

508 U.S. 520 (1993).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
64
See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 559 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
65
E.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999); Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, 940 F.
Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996).
66
See Church of the Lukumi Balalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533.
67
See id. at 542-45. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:
Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850
(2001), argues that there are two distinct requirements.
68
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
63

454

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:435

sacrifice for ritual purposes, holding that the ordinances were not
neutral and generally applicable, with the consequence that the
Sherbert-Yoder rather than the Smith standard applied. The Court
found that the ordinances permitted the killing of animals for many
secular purposes—sport and science, for instance—while prohibiting
religious sacrifice. But the fact that the ordinances permitted almost
all secular killings, but not all, left a doubt as to the sense in which
they were non-neutral and not generally applicable. Does a law fail
the Smith test only when a religious use is the sole object of
prohibition, or might it also fail that test even though some secular
70
uses are also covered by the prohibition? If it might fail though
some secular uses are forbidden, how many and what kind of secular
uses? Might a law be neutral and generally applicable only when its
prohibition extends to religious use and to all secular uses? What
policy would determine the point along the scale where the line is to
be drawn? The inclusion within the prohibited class of some or of
many secular uses will determine the relative effect of a government
action or program on the positions of religion and nonreligion in the
society. But there still must be resort to some fundamental
philosophy to determine what is the permissible relative effect. No
solution can be found simply by reference to “underinclusiveness” or
by a mechanical insistence that if one secular use is permitted,
religious use must also be permitted. From the fundamental
constitutional philosophy must be derived both the value attached to
various secular objectives and the value attached to the practice of
religion. This question will be discussed further in considering
another part of the Smith opinion, which states that the Smith rule
does not apply when provision is made in the law for “individualized
assessment” of liability or benefits. In any event, holding that the
Free Exercise Clause never entitles religion to exemption when all
secular instances are prohibited, cannot rest upon simple assertion.
Apart from the unclarity of “neutral [and] generally applicable,”
there are exceptions to the Smith rule expressly set forth in the Smith
opinion itself: It does not apply in “hybrid” cases, and as just
mentioned, it does not apply in cases in which there is “individualized
71
governmental assessment.”
If a case comes within one of these
exceptions, the familiar Sherbert-Yoder standard applies.
These
exceptions in the hands of lower courts unhappy with the Smith rule
70

See Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 364-67 (holding that Free Exercise
Clause was violated by refusal to allow police to wear beards for religious reasons
when allowed for medical reasons); Duncan, supra note 67, at 868-83 (discussing
“underinclusiveness”).
71
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881, 884.
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also have the capacity virtually to destroy it.
The hybrid exception applies when, in addition to a claim under
the Free Exercise Clause, there is also a claim on some other
constitutional ground, for instance free speech, freedom of
association, substantive due process, or protected property rights. In
Smith, the Court distinguished Yoder on the ground that it involved a
substantive due process claim: the right of parents to determine the
72
education of their children.
Courts and commentators have
pointed out that if there is a violation of an independent
constitutional right, invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is
73
superfluous. Some courts have held that all that is needed to satisfy
the hybrid exception is a “colorable” independent constitutional
74
claim. Such a colorable claim will activate the free exercise claim
and make Sherbert-Yoder applicable. However, no court has been able
to explain why such a merely colorable constitutional claim should
have this effect. Some courts have noted that there is scarcely a case
75
in which another colorable constitutional claim cannot be made.
76
For example, in City of Boerne v. Flores, mentioned above, one of the
two Supreme Court decisions since Smith that reaffirmed its doctrine,
an Archbishop wished for pastoral reasons to enlarge a church, but
was prohibited from doing so by the local Landmark Commission. In
addition to his free exercise claim, did not the Archbishop have a
colorable claim of deprivation of constitutionally protected property
rights? In Smith itself, in addition to the free exercise claim, the
petitioners could have argued that their rights to free speech and
freedom of association had been violated: peyote use was probably an
expressive activity and almost certainly involved association with
others.
The exemption stated in Smith for cases in which the state has in
place a system of “individualized governmental assessment,” of which
77
Sherbert was suggested to be an example, is almost as unclear as the
hybrid exception. The reference could be to situations in which
there is a high degree of official discretion, which might be exercised
72

Id. at 888.
Jonathan B. Hensley, Note, Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights Doctrine in Free Exercise
Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119 (2000) (reviewing lower court decisions).
74
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), reh’g
granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc, 220 F.3d
1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (vacating lower court’s judgment and remanding with
instructions to dismiss as not ripe for review), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001).
75
See, e.g., id. at 705.
76
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
77
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
73
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to the unjustified disadvantaging of religion, thus eliciting the
78
protective response of the Sherbert-Yoder requirement.
Another
possibility is that what the Court means to cover by this
“individualized” exception are situations in which, although law is
made and discretion limited, this is done in a common-law fashion,
by the accumulation of precedents, perhaps in the course of
interpreting broad statutory language. But why would use of this
process of law-making call for departure from the Smith rule? Finally,
a system of “individualized governmental assessment” could refer
simply to those cases in which a law disadvantages religion to a degree
that conflicts with the fundamental norm underlying the Religion
Clauses regarding the permissible relative effect of state action on the
positions of the religious and the secular in society. This idea of the
significance of the breadth of entitlement or of burdens under a
79
government program is familiar in Establishment Clause analysis,
but here it appears in connection with the Free Exercise Clause. If
animal sacrifice is permitted for science and sport, then possibly the
Free Exercise Clause requires that it be allowed for religious
purposes. Language in Sherbert suggests that this idea of permissible
relative effect, either in regard to entitlements or burdens, could be
part of the explanation for that decision: If unemployment
compensation is provided to those who are not available for work for
some “personal reasons,” then it must be provided to those who are
80
not available for work for religious reasons. As will be appreciated,
this way of reading the “individualized assessment” exception suggests
that in fact it is not an exception to the Smith rule at all, but that the
existence of various provisions in the government program has
rendered it not a “neutral law of general applicability.” And to repeat
what was stated earlier, if the values embodied in the Free Exercise
Clause require that religion not be excluded from a benefit when
some or many secular activities are admitted to it, it should not be out
of the question that those same values may require that religion
receive a benefit even when the legislature has attempted to limit the
advantages of a program to a particular state objective and to exclude
all other interests, secular and religious. Thus, in the context of the
78

For useful observations on Smith’s “individualized assessment” exception, see
American Friends Service Committee Corp. v. Thornburgh, 951 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir.
1991). See also Kenneth D. Sansom, Note, Sharing the Burden: Exploring the Space
Between Uniform and Specific Applicability in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 753, 765 n.85 (1999).
79
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
80
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401-02 n.4 (1963).
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Sherbert case, the very values that require the state to give
unemployment compensation to Mrs. Sherbert when it makes them
available to those who cannot work for some secular personal
reasons, may require it to give compensation to Mrs. Sherbert even if
it does not do so for any secular personal reasons. This is because the
Free Exercise Clause attaches such great value to a person’s being
able to live in accordance with her conscience: If the state pursues a
certain secular objective—e.g., by an insurance scheme it seeks to
offset the effects of economic recession and business dislocations—it
must be equally protective of religious conscience.
Whatever exactly the Smith rule is, its announcement signaled a
sharp break from an important idea of the Framers, embodied in the
Free Exercise Clause, an idea referred to by Justice O’Connor in City
of Boerne when she spoke of the “special constitutional status” of
81
religion. This idea essentially is that a person has a moral duty to act
in accordance with his conscience and that the state has a correlative
duty not to interfere with the discharge of this primary duty except
for weighty reasons. Even if the Free Exercise Clause does not rest
upon the same morality that moves the conscience of the individual,
it does rest upon a morality that recognizes an individual’s duty to act
in accordance with conscience.
This idea received eloquent expression in Chief Justice Hughes’s
82
dissenting opinion in United States v. McIntosh. That case concerned
a Presbyterian minister who had applied for naturalization. The case
involved the interpretation of an act of Congress that required as a
condition of naturalization an oath of allegiance. The minister was
willing to take the oath, but only if he could reserve the duty he
believed he owed to God. The majority of the Court held that under
the statute he was not qualified to become a citizen. Chief Justice
Hughes, in a much-quoted dissent, took the position that the statute
should not be interpreted in a manner so contrary to our founding
ideology and political traditions. His opinion in McIntosh, even
though not directly addressed to a constitutional question, implied
that the source of the constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion lies in a belief in an obligation to follow conscience. What
marks off the right of free exercise from other constitutional rights—
for instance the right of free speech—is the importance attached to
the state of mind of the individual, his sense of an obligation that
transcends human authority. Chief Justice Hughes’s view of the
correct interpretation of the Naturalization Act, as illuminated by the
81
82

City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 563 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
283 U.S. 605, 627, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).

458

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:435

tradition of respect for conscience, became the view of the Court
83
itself in Girouard v. United States, which overruled McIntosh.
Unease in some of the lower courts manifested by a narrow
understanding of when the Smith rule applies, a liberal reading of its
exceptions, or outright unwillingness to believe that Smith means
what it says as applied to certain pre-Smith cases, evidences the
magnitude of the break between the Smith rule and the earlier
understanding, just referred to, of the importance of obligations
believed to be derived from a source higher than human authority.
An example of the second type of response to Smith is the panel
84
decision in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, where the
court held that the refusal on religious grounds of a landlord to rent
to unmarried couples, contrary to a state statute, came within the
hybrid exception to Smith—a colorable constitutional property right
as well as a free exercise claim—and that there was no compelling
85
reason to override religious conscience in the circumstances.
Examples of the third response to Smith are the decisions of those
courts that have refused to find that Smith overrules the so-called
“ministerial exception,” under which decisions relating to the
employment of clergy are constitutionally exempt from state
86
regulations applicable to other sorts of employment.
Mention also may be made of a line of decisions in which the
Supreme Court has held that because of free exercise concerns, there
must be special rules for deciding intra-church disputes, which will
enable civil courts to avoid answering questions about religious
doctrine or polity, even though they are free to answer similar
87
doctrinal and organizational questions in a secular context. Lower
courts continue to observe this special rule requirement even though
it may be in contravention of Smith and not within any of its
88
exceptions.
As already suggested, in assessing challenges to jurors on
religious grounds, not only must the Free Exercise Clause be
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328 U.S. 61 (1946).
165 F.3d at 711-12, 717-18.
85
Compare Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), a pre-Smith
decision, which upheld against a free exercise claim the denial of tax exemption to
an educational institution that discriminated in admissions on racial grounds for
religious reasons.
86
E.g., EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000).
87
E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Presbyterian Church in the United
States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
88
See, e.g., Pentecostal Church of God I.M. of New Haven, Inc. v. Pentecostal
Church of God International Movement, 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 1 (2001).
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considered, but the Establishment Clause as well. Refusal to allow
such challenges when challenges on nonreligious grounds are
allowed might give a degree of assistance to religion that is forbidden
by the Establishment Clause. At the other extreme, if a religiouslymotivated verdict would violate the Establishment Clause, it might be
required by that clause that a challenge aimed at eliminating the risk
of such a verdict be sustained.
Under the Establishment Clause, the primary focus is on the
“purpose” of a law or other government action, although occasionally
89
attention also is given to actual effects, whether benefits or burdens.
The notion of purpose in this context appears to embrace two ideas:
first, that the law be capable of justification on a secular ground—
possibly meaning without reference to the transcendent or
supernatural, though doubtless this does not exclude all ideas of
value—and second, that on its face the relative effect of the law in
regard to benefits or burdens on the positions of religion and
nonreligion in the society be of a certain kind. What is the
permissible relative effect, as noted earlier, must be derived from a
substantive constitutional philosophy that attaches a certain
importance to religion compared to other human interests. It should
be noted that this second requirement may be violated even though
the law or other government action is capable of justification on
entirely secular grounds.
In addition to limiting the “purpose” of government programs in
the ways just indicated, there is some basis for believing that the
Establishment Clause also requires that such programs actually have
been motivated by secular and not religious beliefs. The strongest
90
precedent for this additional requirement is Epperson v. Arkansas,
where in invalidating a law prohibiting the teaching of evolution in
the public schools, the Supreme Court relied on statements made in
the public debate preceding the vote on the popular initiative that
resulted in the law, that the theory of evolution was inconsistent with
91
the creation account in the Bible. A government action might be
capable of justification on secular grounds, but still actually have
been motivated by religious belief. Thus, if the Free Exercise Clause
is concerned with the actual effect of legislation on religious believers
and the problem posed for their consciences, the Establishment
89

For a summary of the Court’s tergiversations on this matter, see Zelman, 536
U.S. at 655-60.
90
393 U.S. 97 (1968).
91
Id. at 106-09. Additional support for the proposition that actual motive matters
may be found in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), but the Court’s opinion is
not clear on the point.
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Clause may be concerned with the actual beliefs and motivations of
legislators and other government officials and even of voters.
Among the Supreme Court’s many Establishment Clause
decisions, it is only with difficulty that one can find consistency.
Thus, is it possible to uphold an act of Congress that permits religious
organizations to discriminate on religious grounds in the treatment
of their employees—e.g., firing a janitor employed by a Mormonowned gymnasium open to the public because he was not “temple
92
worthy” —and at the same time to strike down legislation that
93
exempts religious publications from a state sales tax?
In recent years the Court has increasingly relaxed the
restrictions of the Establishment Clause and widened the area within
94
which legislative discretion may operate. Furthermore, bit by bit, it
has abandoned or relaxed limiting ancillary tests that when adopted
were intended to implement general Establishment Clause objectives.
In school aid programs, for example, the Court no longer requires
any sort of “separation” between the secular and the religious in
private schools—e.g., a state-employed sign-language translator may
assist a student attending a parochial school, even by translating
95
religion lessons. The recent decision permitting a voucher program
96
that includes religiously-affiliated schools marks the culmination of
a long trend to relax earlier doctrinal restrictions.
The relation between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause continues to be notoriously difficult to explain.
Under Sherbert, there was a possibility that everything that was not
forbidden by the former was required by the latter; Justice Harlan
97
pointed this out in his dissent in Sherbert. Under the Smith regime,
there is less likelihood of conflict between the two clauses because the
tendency of Smith is to conform free exercise analysis to that of the
Establishment Clause: If the “purpose” of the program is
permissible—i.e., it is neutral and generally applicable—it does not
matter that an effect may be to burden the free exercise of religion.
As mentioned earlier, the Establishment Clause itself is only rarely
suggested to be concerned with the actual effect of a government
program on the practice of religion; it is concerned with purpose and
92

Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
94
For the most recent step in this direction in connection with aid to education,
see Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
95
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); see also Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 639 (2000).
96
Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
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Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 418, 422-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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perhaps with legislative motive. The Smith regime, combined with the
relaxation of Establishment Clause limitations, greatly reduces the
tension between the two clauses. But, of course, if under Smith a law
is not neutral and generally applicable, or if one of the exceptions
applies, then the Sherbert-Yoder test will be enforced, so that the
problem of tension between the two clauses remains as great as ever.
III. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES RELATING TO RELIGION
The effect of the Religion Clauses on juror challenges and
peremptory challenges in particular must now be assessed. If it is
settled that peremptory challenges may not be based upon race or
sex, as noted at the start, the Supreme Court has yet to decide
whether they may be based upon or affect religion. Before
addressing the effect of the Religion Clauses on this question,
however, it will be useful to consider the significance of religion from
the perspective of the “impartial jury” requirement of the Sixth
Amendment. As will be recalled, this constitutional provision
includes both a right to have the petty jury selected at random from a
fair cross-section of the population and a right not to have present on
the jury anyone as to whom there is more than a certain likelihood of
misconduct, the misconduct involved including the use of
background beliefs about facts or notions of the good other than
those possessed by some cognizable group. A cognizable group is a
group that has distinctive beliefs and is of substantial size. A religious
group may or may not be a Sixth Amendment cognizable group: it is
likely to have distinctive beliefs, but it may or may not be of
substantial size.
Baptists, for example, would certainly be a
cognizable group in most American jurisdictions, but Muslims would
be only in some. I am assuming here that attention is focused
exclusively on the Sixth Amendment and that all other constitutional
provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause and the Religion
Clauses, are left out of account. When we come to consider the
Religion Clauses, size may be irrelevant. Again, if we restrict
ourselves to the Sixth Amendment, a group may be a cognizable
group for that purpose simply by virtue of its size and its distinctive
beliefs whatever the content of those beliefs, whether founded on
98
ideas of the supernatural or limited to secular notions. When we
come to consider other constitutional provisions—the Establishment
Clause, for instance—the nature of the beliefs the group embraces
98

Cf. United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1943) (suggesting
compulsory attendance of Jehovah’s Witness necessary if representative character of
jury to be met).

462

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:435

may be all-important.
The Supreme Court decisions that developed the standard as to
when it is permissible to exclude from the jury in capital cases those
who have doubts about capital punishment, decisions earlier referred
to, provide an example of pure Sixth Amendment analysis. These
decisions held that it is permissible to exclude from the jury for cause
persons whose beliefs would substantially impair their ability to apply
the law and to limit themselves to the evidence, but that it is
impermissible to exclude persons simply because they have doubts
about capital punishment. To exclude persons in the former group
enforces the idea of an impartial jury by excluding those as to whom
there is a significant risk that they will go beyond their assigned role
as to facts and values. To exclude those in the latter category would
be to exclude representatives of a group in the population of
sufficient size and with distinctive beliefs associated with doubts about
capital punishment that would constitute a cognizable group for
Sixth Amendment purposes. To exclude such persons merely
because of some risk that they will go beyond permissible beliefs and
act against the intent of the law would be to deprive the defendant of
his right to a jury chosen at random from a fair cross-section of the
population.
The Supreme Court capital punishment decisions just referred
to concerned the question of when a person may be excluded from
the jury for cause. It is important for our purposes to note that in
another decision the Supreme Court made clear that even though a
challenge for cause against a person who is merely doubtful about
capital punishment may not be sustained, such a person may be
99
excluded by a peremptory challenge. We have mentioned before
that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is not considered
to be violated by peremptory challenges generally, even though their
exercise interferes with the results of random selection from a fair
cross-section, and even though they may have the effect of keeping
off the jury representatives of cognizable groups as to whom there is
100
not enough risk of misconduct to justify exclusion for cause. That
the peremptory is based upon religious considerations would not
seem to affect the validity of this proposition.
It is surely the case that many people who are opposed to capital

99

See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987); id. at 671-72 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940 (1986) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari).
100
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1991) (relying on Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474 (1990)).
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punishment or who are doubtful about it base their opposition on
religious belief. Yet the question of religion was not discussed in the
Supreme Court cases just mentioned, which, as stated, were treated as
pure Sixth Amendment cases. The decisions were reached without
101
any consideration of the possible effect of the Religion Clauses.
Criminal defendants who invoked the Sixth Amendment in these
cases probably had standing also to invoke the free exercise rights of
dismissed jurors, but these rights were not discussed. It will be
recalled from the first part of this Article that criminal defendants are
allowed to invoke the equal protection rights of excluded jurors.
If a religious group or the entire group of all believers might or
might not constitute a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment
purposes, so it might or might not be a specially protected class
under the Equal Protection Clause, a class entitled to more than
simply the requirement of a rational connection between the law in
question and a permissible governmental objective. If the whole class
of religious believers has never been the object of invidious
discrimination in the United States, the same cannot be said of
particular religious groups—for instance the Mormons, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and the Santerias. Perhaps religious “fundamentalists” or
even religious “liberals” have had experiences that would qualify as
invidious discrimination. Nonbelievers, of course, have sometimes
been the object of persecution. Under the Equal Protection Clause,
as contrasted with the Sixth Amendment, the size of the
disadvantaged group is irrelevant, except so far as smallness may
contribute to the group’s being a target of persecution and unable to
defend itself through the ordinary political process. Unlike cases of
race, however, it cannot be said that most cases of religious
classification have been attended by invidiousness, so that whenever
there is use of this category, there must be strict or heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Recall that at this point
in our analysis we are disregarding the Religion Clauses. To demand
strong justification for a religious classification if there is a showing
that a particular religious group has been subjected to invidious
treatment, might pose unmanageable difficulties for the
102
administration of constitutional law. In any event, although it may
101

In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), however, the jurors who had
been unconstitutionally excluded for cause had been removed under a state statute
that excluded persons who had “conscientious scruples” against capital punishment.
102
Investigation into the history and current situation of a multitude of religious
groups and attitudes toward them might be required. But see Melissa R. Triedman,
Note, Extending Batson v. Kentucky to Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges, 4 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 99, 104-05, 115 (1994) (suggesting that such inquiry would not be
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be analytically satisfying to determine whether a juror challenge on
the basis of religion should be disallowed under the Equal Protection
Clause, given that challenges on the basis of race or sex are
impermissible, the question is largely academic, because when the
Religion Clauses are taken into account, they preempt the field and
render an independent discussion of equal protection unnecessary.
When jury challenges are scrutinized under the Sixth
Amendment, the interest protected is that of the party who resists the
challenge—his interest in trial by an “impartial jury.” When jury
challenges are scrutinized under the Equal Protection Clause, it has
come to be accepted, as noted earlier, that the interest primarily
protected is that of the jurors, an interest in not being excluded from
an important public function on account of race or sex. If early
decisions under the Equal Protection Clause considered the effect on
the parties, on the atmosphere of the trial, and on the public at
103
104
large, recent decisions focus primarily on the rights of the jurors.
At the same time, as already mentioned, it is settled that the rights of
the jurors may be invoked by a party, since otherwise, as a practical
matter, those rights would not be vindicated.
Certain preliminaries having been dealt with and necessary
distinctions made, the time has come to discuss directly the
applicability of the Free Exercise Clause to challenges to jurors, both
for cause and peremptory. In the earlier general discussion of the
Free Exercise Clause, a distinction was made between those cases that
must be dealt with under the rule of the Smith case, and those that
must be dealt with under the Sherbert-Yoder approach. If a law is a
neutral law of general applicability, that is the end of the free
exercise claim so far as the Smith rule is concerned, and no
consideration need be paid to the importance of the governmental
interest that the law is designed to uphold. On the other hand, if the
law is not a neutral law of general applicability, or it falls within one
of Smith’s exceptions, there must be a compelling interest to justify it.
It may seem odd in the case of peremptory challenges to speak of a
law and to ask whether it is neutral and generally applicable: it would
be better, perhaps, to speak of an action or decision taken by a party,
which the Supreme Court has chosen to consider governmental
action for the purpose of the application of the Bill of Rights and the

required); cf. Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. App. 1987) (involving a
prosecutor who explained peremptory challenge by saying juror’s religious
preference—Church of Christ—was “a little bit away from the main stream”).
103
E.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
104
E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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Fourteenth Amendment. In asking whether this action or decision is
neutral and generally applicable for free exercise purposes, we are
asking, in part at least, whether there is a reason for it other than one
concerning religion. This question could be directed to whether the
challenge is capable of justification other than on a ground relating
to religion, or to whether the lawyer making the challenge is actually
motivated by consideration of religion. It would be surprising,
perhaps, to discover that actual motivation is intended, for we are
accustomed to encountering this concern in connection with the
Establishment Clause, not the Free Exercise Clause; even in the case
of the Establishment Clause, the relevance of actual motivation is not
free from doubt. In the case of objections to challenges to jurors
under the Equal Protection Clause on the ground that the challenges
are based on race or sex, there does indeed seem to be concern with
what actually motivated the challenging lawyer, although a recent
Supreme Court decision that directs the trial judge to reject the
objection if the challenging lawyer, when called upon to explain the
challenge, states what on its face is a nonracial or nonsexual reason,
105
may point in the other direction.
But the policy of the Smith
decision, which concededly can be only dimly perceived, possibly can
be upheld by finding that “neutral [and] generally applicable” looks
only to whether there is a plausible nonreligious justification for the
challenge on its face.
An example of a neutral, generally applicable challenge might
be a challenge to a juror who is believed to be opposed to abortion.
Persons opposed to abortion, a prosecutor might think, are less likely
to sympathize with victims of crime. Such a view might be held
regardless of the ideological basis of the opposition to abortion,
whether it be religious or nonreligious. The actual motivation of a
particular challenging prosecutor might correspond to this view: it
makes no difference to him whether the juror is religious or
nonreligious; his experience suggests that most persons opposed to
abortion, regardless of their ideological orientation, are not reliable
jurors for the prosecution. Another prosecutor, to the contrary,
might challenge a juror precisely because he believes the juror’s
opposition to abortion is religiously based. The same contrast might
be found in the capital punishment cases earlier referred to: one
prosecutor might challenge all those who have difficulty with capital
punishment; another might challenge only those whose scruples are
106
based on religion.
But even if subjective motivation makes a
105
106

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
The Court’s opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
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difference under the Equal Protection Clause, should it affect the
classification of a peremptory challenge as neutral and generally
applicable for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause and the Smith
decision?
Even if a challenge to a juror is neutral and generally applicable
for Smith purposes, it may come within one of the exceptions set forth
in Smith, so that the Sherbert-Yoder test will apply. Might a challenge to
a juror on religious grounds come within the hybrid exception? As
mentioned before in discussing the Smith case itself, it will be rare
that the practice of religion does not involve speech and association,
so that a colorable claim cannot also be made under a part of the
First Amendment other than the Free Exercise Clause. But the
exception that seems most likely to be applicable to peremptory
challenges is the exception in Smith for situations involving
“individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the
107
relevant conduct.”
Stating this exception, the Court had
immediately in mind determinations of eligibility for unemployment
compensation, in order to avoid overruling Sherbert and its line of
cases. In the earlier general discussion of the Free Exercise Clause, it
was suggested that the argument for this individualized assessment
exception could be that when there is such an assessment, even
though a nonreligious reason perhaps can be stated for the
governmental action, there is a significant risk that in practice,
perhaps over a series of determinations, religion will be
disadvantaged to a degree that conflicts with the fundamental
philosophy underlying the Religion Clauses concerning the
permissible relative effect of governmental action on religion and
nonreligion. Readers familiar with the pre-Batson regime of Swain v.
108
Alabama, under which the Equal Protection Clause would be
violated by a prosecutor’s peremptories only if there was a pattern or
practice of racial discrimination over a number of cases, will
recognize a similar idea at work here. It may seem strange to attach
significance to the possibility of an impermissible disadvantaging of
religion by a series of peremptory challenges if the challenges are
508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993), would characterize this action as “targeting religious
beliefs.” Brian Galle, Note, Free Exercise Rights of Capital Jurors, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
569, 578 nn.43, 44 (2001), appreciates the distinction between why a lawyer
challenges a juror—because he is opposed to abortion or because he is opposed to
abortion on religious grounds—and what has brought the juror within a challenged
category. In other words, the lawyer challenges the juror because he is opposed to
abortion, but the juror has been brought to his opposition by religious belief.
107
494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990); see Galle, supra note 106, at 583 (suggesting that even
challenges for cause may come within the individualized exception).
108
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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made by lawyers for private parties, but this oddity is the result of the
Court’s insistence that all peremptory challenges are to be attributed
to the state, at least so far as concerns the applicability of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court’s response in Smith to the danger posed by
“individualized assessment” of an impermissible disadvantaging of
religion is to return to the Sherbert-Yoder requirement of a compelling
state interest. An example of a case falling within the individualized
109
assessment exception is Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland,
where an historic district commission refused to allow a monastery to
be torn down even though church leaders’ reasons for wanting it
replaced were concededly religious. The court held that the
commission’s determination did not fall under the Smith rule, but
under the individualized assessment exception.
As in the
unemployment compensation cases, there was a possibility that over
time, religion would be impermissibly disadvantaged. In addition,
the court determined that the state’s interest in not having the
110
monastery torn down was not compelling.
It is difficult to think of a situation that falls more comfortably
into the individualized assessment category—if that is an intelligible
category—than peremptory challenges. There is no standard that
limits the challenger—other than the Constitution. He is entirely
free to exercise his judgment on the particulars of the case and the
individual juror, and even if one prospective juror is indistinguishable
from another, to make opposite decisions regarding whether to
challenge. As with the practice of the historic district commission in
Keeler, the power of peremptory challenges may be used in such a way
as to advantage or disadvantage religion over a series of actions.
If the Smith rule does not apply to peremptory challenges
because they involve individualized assessments, then the fact that a
peremptory challenge has a secular purpose, either in the sense that
a secular explanation for it can be plausibly suggested or in the sense
that the challenge was in fact motivated by a secular reason—see for
instance the abortion hypothetical stated above—is not dispositive of
109

940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996).
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994), the Court held that the creation by special act of the state legislature of a
school district in which all the residents were Satmar Hasidic Jews and which was
motivated by a desire to help the Satmars to practice their religion, violated the
Establishment Clause. This conclusion could be explained by the Court’s fear that
the use of special acts, rather than general legislation, might lead in practice to
favoring one religion over others or to impermissibly favoring religion over
nonreligion. See id. at 702-05 (1993); see also Julie D. Arp, Note, The Batson Analysis
and Religious Discrimination, 74 OR. L. REV. 721, 736 (1995).
110
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a free exercise claim. The elimination of the applicability of the
Smith rule, either because the governmental action is not neutral and
of general application or because it involves individualized
assessment, returns us to the familiar terrain of Sherbert-Yoder, where
the questions are whether there is a burden on religion, and if there
is, whether there is a compelling state interest to justify it. In the
context of peremptory challenges, again employing the abortion
hypothetical, the question is not simply whether the purpose of the
challenge was to exclude all persons opposed to abortion regardless
of the ideological basis for opposition, but whether the exclusion of
those whose opposition is in fact based upon religion burdens the
practice of their religion, and if it does, whether the burden is
justified by a compelling state interest. Even if a challenge was
motivated by or is capable of explanation on the basis of a reason that
has nothing to do with religion, it may burden the religious juror’s
practice of his religion, because but for his religious belief he would
not find himself in the class to which the peremptory is directed—
those opposed to abortion. In this sense the juror’s religion causes
111
his exclusion.
There can be no doubt that exclusion from a jury on religious
grounds burdens the practice of religion. Jury service is an important
governmental function, both an honor and a responsibility. That a
person excluded from a particular jury may be selected for another is
true: systematic exclusion of members of a religious group from a
particular kind of case or from all cases—such as was the practice
with Blacks and women in parts of the country until recently—would
of course impose a more serious burden. But the Free Exercise
Clause is violated if there is any burden, judged from a secular point
112
of view.
It should be kept in mind that although there may be
111

For a case in which the party who challenged the juror did indeed seem to be
interested in the ideological basis for the juror’s attitude, see State v. Ball, 685 P.2d
1055, 1056-57 (Utah 1984). This was a prosecution for driving while drunk, in which
jurors who had said they did not drink were not allowed to be asked whether their
abstention was for personal or religious reasons. The court held that it was error not
to allow this question, that an answer might have given reasons for a peremptory
challenge, and by implication that such a challenge would not have violated a state
constitutional provision declaring that no one should be considered incompetent to
be a juror on account of religious belief. Id. at 1060-61.
112
See Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
that the burden need not be substantial when religion has been targeted); Arp, supra
note 110, at 738. But see WJM ex rel. KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046,
1050-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (seeming to require substantial burden); id. at 1053
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (opining that even a slight burden is sufficient when
religion is targeted), reh’g denied, 210 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir.) (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the idea that a de minimis violation of Free Exercise Clause is
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invidious implications in particular instances in which the practice of
religion is burdened and the purposes of the Free Exercise Clause no
doubt include the elimination of such invidiousness, invidiousness is
not a requirement for a violation of the clause.
As has been noted, the Equal Protection Clause is a violated only
if there is an impermissible governmental purpose, either in the
sense of the law’s being incapable of justification except on grounds
of race or sex or in the sense of actual motivation. It is not enough
that the complainant—the excluded juror—has been adversely
affected. This is why Batson cases are so taken up with the question of
what showing there must be of the purpose of the challenge and the
113
challenger’s state of mind.
Under the Establishment Clause,
equally, there is a requirement of purpose, again in either or both of
the senses just set forth. A peremptory challenge could violate the
Establishment Clause if its purpose was to prefer a particular religion
over others or to advantage religion over nonreligion to an
impermissible degree. But, as we have seen, under the Free Exercise
Clause, assuming Sherbert-Yoder applies, what is important is not the
purpose of the governmental action, but its effect.
Suppose a peremptory challenge is based on the fact that a

permissible), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1010 (2000). Although the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act requires a “substantial burden,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000), it is not
clear that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause itself
require it. Although Yoder involved possible criminal punishment, Sherbert concerned
only loss of an economic benefit. In any event, if a substantial burden is required, it
seems clear that the burden must not be judged from a religious point of view—
either that of the particular religion involved or from any other religious point of
view—but from a secular point of view, in order to avoid courts’ becoming engaged
in efforts to understand religious doctrine.
With the burden of exclusion from a jury may be compared the burden of being
compelled to serve on a jury in violation of one’s religious beliefs. See In re Jenison,
125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963) (on remand for reconsideration in light of Sherbert v.
Verner, holding that under the circumstances, there was no compelling state interest
to override the free exercise right not to serve); see also United States v. Hillyard, 52
F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1943) (similar); State v. Everly, 146 S.E.2d 705 (W. Va.
1966) (similar). Would a requirement of jury service be a neutral and generally
applicable law under Smith or would the usual numerous exclusions and exemptions
deprive it of that character? Would the requirement fall under either of the
exceptions to the Smith rule? Justice Story, on circuit, had a case before him
involving both the question of whether a juror who had conscientious scruples
should be required to serve and the question of whether he should be allowed to
serve, and he ruled that the answer to both questions was no, although without
referring to any constitutional provisions. United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650
(C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868).
113
See, e.g., Purkett, 514 U.S. 765; United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157
(3d Cir. 1989).
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114

prospective juror is not religious. Such a challenge cannot be said
to be irrational: a lawyer may have experience that nonbelievers are
more likely to engage in misconduct as jurors or are less likely to be
favorably disposed to the party he represents than believers. Such a
challenge might not violate the Free Exercise Clause—
notwithstanding the puzzle of how religion can be freely exercised if
the Constitution treats believers more favorably than nonbelievers—
but the Establishment Clause might block such a challenge. An
objection to the challenge also could be founded, in the federal
courts at least, on the provision in Article VI of the original
115
Constitution that prohibits religious tests for office, and in state
courts on that same provision if it is made applicable to the states by
116
However, neither the Establishment
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Clause nor the religious test provision of Article VI may give to the
unbelieving juror the same protection as the Free Exercise Clause
gives to believers. A peremptory challenge on the basis that the juror
is not religious should be distinguished from one based on the
absence of any sense of moral obligation (assuming there is such a
thing as nonreligious morality), which probably may be the basis not
117
only for a peremptory challenge, but also for a challenge for cause.
Now we must come to weighing the interest in religious liberty
that would be upheld by forbidding peremptory challenges affecting
religion against the interest in allowing such challenges. Although
the Court strenuously seeks to avoid such a weighing by the Smith
rule, the task still must be undertaken if a governmental action is not
neutral and of general applicability or falls within one of the Smith
exceptions.
114

Cf. Grady v. State, 730 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tex. App. 1987), vacated on other
grounds, 761 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
115
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
116
Some state constitutions have no-religious-test provisions and other provisions
stating that religious opinions shall not render a person incompetent to be a juror.
In State v. Leuch, 88 P.2d 440, 441-42 (Wash. 1939), the court held that neither sort of
provision prevented excluding for cause in a capital case a juror who was
conscientiously opposed to the death penalty in any circumstances. See Justin Dolan,
Comment, Thou Shall Not Strike: Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges under the
Washington State Constitution, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 451 (2001). In Bader v. State, 40
S.W.3d 738, 741-43 (Ark.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 826 (2001), the court referred to
provisions in federal and state constitutions prohibiting religious tests for office, but
the significance for its holding that there was no error in the circumstances of that
case in forbidding inquiry into jurors’ religion is unclear. See also People v. Langston,
641 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding state constitutional provision prohibiting
discrimination in civil rights because of religion violated by peremptory challenge to
Islamic juror).
117
Compare the question of the sense of moral obligation required to make a
person competent to be a witness. FED. R. EVID. 601, 603.
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In favor of allowing peremptory challenges based on religion are
the arguments set forth earlier in favor of peremptory challenges
generally: they enable the parties to rid the jury of persons who pose
a significant risk of misconduct, although not enough to justify
exclusion for cause; they enable the parties to eliminate jurors who,
although they pose no risk of misconduct, hold views that are
unfavorable to the challenging party—there being nothing wrong
with allowing the parties in this context to pursue their own interests
and, through their combined peremptory challenges, to narrow the
range of views represented on the jury; and, finally, party
participation in the formation of the tribunal gives to the
proceedings something of the character of arbitration, and so
contributes to the parties’ and the public’s acceptance of the verdict.
Even if these considerations do not add up to a constitutional right to
118
peremptory challenges—and it is settled that no such right exists —
they may support the argument that there is a strong state interest in
allowing peremptory challenges.
In favor of forbidding peremptory challenges affecting religion
is the importance of respecting and not burdening the practice of
religion, a value affirmed in Sherbert, Yoder, and other cases. This
value, as noted earlier, is independent of any invidiousness that may
or may not attend exclusion by a peremptory. As we have seen,
whereas racial discrimination has usually been accompanied by
invidiousness, religious discrimination, like sex discrimination, has
only sometimes been.
In J.E.B., in support of its decision to forbid sex-based
peremptories under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court strongly
condemned what it called “stereotypes” regarding the difference
between men and women and what they think. This condemnation
could be based simply on the ground that these “stereotypes” are
incorrect or exaggerated and should not for that reason be
reinforced by governmental recognition. But this contradicts the
point of peremptories. More likely, as suggested earlier, the Court
condemned “stereotypical” thinking about men and women not
because it disagreed with the premises, but because in its judgment
those premises have led to evil social consequences. But the
condemnation of stereotypical thinking about religious differences
and their significance for how believers think and act must be viewed
from a very different perspective and cannot be invoked as a reason
for forbidding religion-based peremptories. Government surely is
forbidden by the Establishment Clause—and indirectly there would
118

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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be implications for free exercise as well—from taking and enforcing
the view that all religions are essentially the same and that being of a
certain religion should not be seen as having much significance for
how a person thinks and acts. Even if there are invidious implications
in the idea that there are differences and that they matter—for
instance that those who adhere to a certain religion are in error and
that their views should be condemned—these implications must be
accepted for the sake of avoiding the evil effects of a government
orthodoxy in regard to the supernatural.
In J.E.B., in determining that sex-based peremptories violated
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court attached significance to what
it considered the slightness of the predictive value of sex in judging
119
how a person will think and act as a juror. The same was true in the
120
The
Court’s decisions regarding peremptories based on race.
slightness of predictive value, the Court thought in J.E.B.,
undermined the claim that such peremptories advanced an
important state interest. The likelihood that the challenges would
keep off the jury a person who would engage in misconduct or who
even would be unfavorable to the challenging party seemed to the
Court slight.
Should such a consideration enter into the
determination of whether there is a compelling state interest in the
case of religious peremptories? Some have expressed the view that in
the case of religion, the predictive value is higher, indeed sufficiently
higher to justify finding a constitutional difference between racial
and sexual challenges on the one hand and religious challenges on
121
the other.
In the case of race and sex, the fact upon which
prediction is based, though not entirely free from difficulties, is
relatively straightforward: it is a physical fact. To found a prediction
on the basis of a person’s religion, however, is to make reference to a
fact of considerable uncertainty. Thus a person’s religion may refer
to something about his state of mind, to his relations with other
persons or with an institution, to his external behavior, or to his
cultural inheritance. Similar uncertainty of reference would attend a
122
peremptory challenge based upon “ethnicity.” Depending on what
119

J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 138 n.9.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 97-98; id. at 104-05 (White, J., concurring).
121
For example, Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 492, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995) (en banc), which held that Batson and J.E.B. did not preclude peremptories
based on religion—the challenged jurors were members of the Pentecostal Church—
relied on the difference in predictive value between race and sex on the one hand
and religion on the other and the lack of invidiousness in the case of religion, the
court suggesting that the greater predictive value eliminated invidiousness.
122
See Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2003).
120
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is meant by the religion of the juror, the predictive value of the fact
could be great or little. Thus, if a person had said that he had a
religious belief in a God who saw no value in human law, the
probability that the person would ignore the law given to him by the
judge would be considerable, whereas if all that can be said is that the
juror is a “member” of a particular church, one of whose officials has
announced such a view as church doctrine, the probability would be
123
less.
So if predictive value is to be considered in assessing the
strength of the state interest for purposes of Sherbert-Yoder, the specific
circumstances of each case may have to be considered. In the case of
peremptories based on race and sex, the Supreme Court held only
that peremptories based exclusively on these relatively
straightforward physical facts violated the Equal Protection Clause. It
made clear that if any other circumstances were present to support
the peremptory—for instance that a particular woman was a member
of the National Organization for Women—the peremptory might be
124
permissible. Therefore, in the case of religion it would have to be
123

In State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 118-22 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001), the court held that
Batson extended to religion, so that a peremptory based on religious “membership”
or “affiliation” would be unconstitutional. The court held, however, that the
peremptory in the litigated case was not of this sort, but was based on the fact that
the juror had said she was a Catholic, was opposed to capital punishment although
that would not prevent her from judging the case fairly, and was a secretary for the
Catholic diocese. In addition, the bishop, the juror’s employer, had recently stated
that the Pope was against capital punishment and Catholics should begin to oppose
it themselves. The issue for the jury in the case, a first degree murder prosecution,
was not whether the death penalty should be imposed, nor even whether the
defendant had killed the victim, but whether the defendant intended or
premeditated the killing. State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 553-54 (Conn. 1999), is
similar: although the court held that a peremptory based on “religious affiliation”
would be unconstitutional, the information the prosecutor relied on in making his
challenge, which included the juror’s membership in a particular Islamic sect and
that he had said he would consult his imam if questions arose, took it out of this
category. It would appear that the term “religious affiliation” as used in this decision
implies a small likelihood of misconduct, and that certain connections with a religion
might constitute more than mere “affiliation.” See also United States v. DeJesus, 347
F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2003) (peremptory challenge based on juror’s “heightened
religious involvement” was not unconstitutional, though challenge based simply on
denominational affiliation might be); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114
(7th Cir. 1998) (pointing to the necessity of distinguishing between “religious
affiliation, a religion’s general tenets, and a specific religious belief”); State v. Fuller,
812 A.2d 389, 397, 406-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (finding no violation of
state constitutional provision prohibiting discrimination in jury selection on basis of
principles where prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was based on inference that
juror dressed in black and wearing a skull cap was probably a Muslim and devout,
and so likely to be forgiving and defense-oriented; dissent finding violation of both
state constitution and Free Exercise Clause, the latter not having been considered by
majority).
124
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143-46.
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decided what about the juror would be equivalent to simply being a
woman or being of a particular race with its attendant insufficiency of
predictive value as to how the person would think and act as a juror.
But perhaps nothing about a juror pertaining to religion would have
such slight predictive value as to undermine the importance of the
state interest in allowing religion-related peremptories.
If the probability of misconduct or unfavorableness should enter
into the calculation of the state’s interest in religion-related
peremptories, a form of misconduct peculiar to these cases must be
attended to. Although it involved exclusion from the legislature and
not from a jury and could be seen as analogous to exclusion for cause
125
rather than by peremptory, McDaniel v. Paty brings out this point.
In McDaniel a state constitution rendered ineligible for office either
in the legislature or in state constitutional conventions, ministers of
religion. A number of different objectives could have been served by
this exclusion. First, it could have been based upon the idea that
involvement of ministers in government and politics conflicts with
their sacred character and function. The value upheld would be
strictly religious. It is clear that such an objective would violate the
Establishment Clause: it embraces a particular idea of religion and
religious leadership and seeks to protect that idea. A second purpose
of the exclusion could have been to create circumstances that would
make more likely full-time devotion to the ministry by those who
undertake it, the function of a minister being deemed of great
importance. This objective does not imply any view of the deleterious
effect of mixing religion with politics. An Establishment Clause
objection concerning undue support of religion might be answered
by also excluding from the legislature persons in other occupations
also considered important, for instance police, firemen, and
members of the Armed Forces. A third purpose could have been
related to the effective working of the legislature itself, rather than to
the protection of religion. Experience might suggest that ministers
with competing responsibilities and great demands on their time
cannot be responsible and effective legislators. But if that is the
argument, it needs to be explained why other classes of busy persons,
such as doctors and lawyers, do not pose the same danger. Finally—
and this is the point in which we are chiefly interested—ministers of
religion in the legislature pose a special risk—or at least so the
adopters of the state constitutional provision might have thought—of
enacting legislation that violates the Establishment Clause, either
125

McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). Purcell, 18 P.3d at 121, cites McDaniel
and suggests its relevance to religion-based peremptories.
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because it is incapable of justification on a secular ground or because
126
it was subjectively motivated by religious belief.
Laymen also may
pose a risk of such an occurrence, but it would be a smaller risk.
In McDaniel the Court struck down the exclusion of ministers
from the legislature on the ground that it violated the free exercise
right of the minister: he must not be required to choose between the
ministry and being a legislator; the restriction imposed an
impermissible burden on the pursuit of his religious vocation.
Although the Court did not mention it, the minister’s interest might
have been coupled with the interest of his parishoners in having him
as their minister, if they had no objection to his also being a
legislator. Indeed, they might have thought this combination a
perfectly appropriate exercise of his ministry. What is clear from the
Supreme Court’s decision is that the minister’s and perhaps the
congregation’s interests in religious liberty outweighed the risk of
conduct by the minister in the legislature that would violate the
127
Establishment Clause.
As mentioned, McDaniel involved what was analogous to some
exclusions for cause in the jury context: the minister was excluded by
virtue of a per se rule addressed to a class of persons. Might the
Supreme Court have reached a different result if exclusion followed
an individualized determination of the risk posed by a particular
person to Establishment Clause values? In any case, two questions are
presented of interest to our inquiry: What is the relevance of
McDaniel’s exclusion from the legislature to exclusion from a jury;
and what is the relevance of constitutional limits on challenges for
cause to peremptory challenges?
Grounds for disqualification from the legislature must be
pertinent to the legislature’s distinctive functions: determining social
policy and laying down general rules. In gathering information to
enable it to discharge these functions, the legislature may proceed in
any way it sees fit. Legislators, not being drawn at random from a
representative cross-section of the population, are not restricted, as
126

See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968).
127
With exclusion of a minister from the legislature, compare La Rocca v. Lane,
338 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1975), in which a prohibition against a Catholic priest-lawyer
wearing his clerical collar while representing a client in a criminal jury trial was
upheld against a free exercise claim made by the priest-lawyer, who said his priestly
vocation required him to wear the collar. The fear was not that the priest-lawyer
would act in some way inconsistent with his duties as a lawyer, but that the jurors,
seeing the collar, would respond in an improper way. If exclusion of a priest from a
jury, simply because he is a priest would violate McDaniel, what about forbidding him
to wear his collar or tell the other jurors that he is a priest?
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jurors are, to background information possessed by some section of
the population of substantial size. In regard to matters of value, the
legislature may embrace any values it sees fit within constitutional
limits. It does not take the law from any other authority. The
particular constitutional limit of concern in the present connection,
although not mentioned by the Court in McDaniel, is the
Establishment Clause. In this perspective, the very special nature of
the Establishment Clause stands forth. It alone of all constitutional
provisions limits the nature of the good that the legislature may
pursue: it may not pursue a transcendent or supernatural good.
Likewise, legislation may not be premised on factual beliefs about the
transcendent or supernatural. As earlier noted, it is not clear
whether this means only that legislation that is enacted must be
reasonably capable of secular justification, or whether in addition it
means that legislation must not have been actually motivated by
religious belief.
Exclusion from a jury will be either for cause or as a result of the
exercise of a peremptory challenge. Exclusion for cause may be by
virtue of a per se rule created by the legislature or developed by the
courts, or by the application of a burden of proof rule to the
likelihood of misconduct suggested by the information available
regarding a particular juror. Misconduct by jurors, the risk of which
may justify exclusion for cause, as is the case with legislators, may
relate either to beliefs about the good or factual beliefs. As observed
earlier, the role of the jury in regard to values is much more limited
than that of the legislature: generally, the jury must take the law from
the judge. In regard to those few situations in which jurors may apply
ideas of the good, they probably must limit themselves to ideas they
128
believe are held by a section of the population of substantial size.
In regard to the facts, the jurors must learn of these through the
formal trial process, subject to the Rules of Evidence, or from
background information held by a section of the population of
substantial size. Thus, the risk of misconduct generally is greater in
the case of jurors than legislators, although this may not be so in the
case of the particular misconduct of a violation of the Establishment
Clause. If the limit of the Establishment Clause is imposed on the
128

The distinction between the functions of the legislature and juries, with
particular reference to peremptory challenges, was noted by Justice Souter in his
dissent in Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1051 n.5 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter wrote that the legislature is concerned with social values, whereas the jury is
concerned to apply law to a set of objectively discovered facts. See Eric L. Muller,
Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment,
106 YALE L.J. 93, 148 (1996).
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legislature, it is impossible to think why it should not also be imposed
on the jury.
Both exercise governmental power under the
Constitution. Thus the jury in exercising its function must not resort
to beliefs about the transcendent or the supernatural, either in
regard to the good or the true.
If the foregoing proposition is correct, the decision in State v. De
129
Mille is wrong. In that case, on a motion for a new trial, the trial
court refused to receive a juror’s affidavit that in the course of jury
deliberations, a juror had stated that during closing argument she
had prayed for a sign concerning defendant’s guilt, had received a
revelation that if defense counsel did not make eye-contact with her
that would indicate guilt, and that he had not made eye-contact. The
appellate court held that there was no error and even suggested that
a contrary result might violate a provision in the state constitution
protecting the rights of conscience and prohibiting religious tests for
130
office.
Jurors may not bring to bear religious beliefs even though they
are confident that the beliefs are held by a group of substantial size in
the population, perhaps even by a majority. Thus the fair crosssection standard of the Sixth Amendment is limited by the
131
Establishment Clause. Furthermore, if in the case of the legislature
129

756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988).
The court further stated that if “a juror might so abandon his or her judgment
to what he or she perceives to be oracular signs as to be unable to fairly consider the
evidence and properly apply the law,” the case might be different. Id. at 84. A
different interpretation of the court’s decision might be that whether or not it is
proper for jurors to be guided by revelations, the rule that jurors’ statements will not
be admitted to impeach a verdict, UTAH R. EVID. 606(b) and FED. R. EVID. 606(b),
precluded evidence of such an event. The dissent was based not on the
Establishment Clause, but on the right to jury trial. See People v. Jenkins, 997 P.2d
1044, 1105 (Cal. 2000) (holding that neither the First nor Sixth Amendment was
violated by excluding for cause a juror who believed that a bubble of light
surrounded each person and would protect him, and who also believed that he could
not predict the influence of his “inner voice” on his deliberations as a juror; the trial
court had a “reasonable concern that the prospective juror’s mysticism and other
observable characteristics would impair his ability—as an individual—to deliberate
rationally”), modified, reh’g denied, No. S007522, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 5222 (Cal. June 28,
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1151 (2001); see also Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 847, 943 (2001) (holding there to be a violation
of Establishment Clause for prosecutor in closing argument of penalty phase of
capital case to tell jurors that God ordains authority and that in imposing death
penalty they would be doing what God says).
131
In State v. Rogers, 825 S.W.2d 49, 51-52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992), defendant
contended that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated by
the fact the venires were composed from lists of persons with drivers’ licenses and
that the Amish, a substantial portion of the local population, did not drive. Were the
Amish a Sixth Amendment cognizable group? Their religious beliefs could not
130
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it is not enough that the results of its activity be capable of secular
justification, but that the activity also must actually be motivated by
secular considerations, it is difficult to see why the same requirement
would not apply to the jury.
In McDaniel, one of the reasons for excluding ministers from the
legislature, as already mentioned, could have been extrinsic to the
legislative process: to preserve the ministers’ sacred function. Other
exclusions for extrinsic policy reasons can be found or may be
imagined, for instance in the case of members of the Armed Forces
or the police. But even if it is permissible to pursue these other
objectives through exclusion—and it may not be, considering the
voters’ interest in having the representatives they want—it is not
permissible to pursue the policy implied by the exclusion of ministers
because of the Establishment Clause: exclusion would uphold a
particular religious idea. If that objective may not be pursued
through exclusion from the legislature, neither may it be pursued
through exclusion from a jury.
Exclusion in either context for a reason intrinsic to the
governmental function involved, namely a risk of a violation of the
Establishment Clause, presents a different question, however. But
McDaniel teaches that this danger is not sufficient to warrant
exclusion of ministers from the legislature in the face of the Free
Exercise Clause. Even more clearly, exclusion of a wider class, say of
all believers, would violate the Free Exercise Clause and perhaps the
no-religious-test provision of Article VI, although with the members
of this class also there may be a risk of recourse to beliefs in the
supernatural. Elimination of the risk does not justify the cost.
Exclusion of nonbelievers probably would be blocked by the
Establishment Clause and the no-religious-test provision. But in the
case of both the legislature and the jury, it is conceivable that there
could be a situation in which a class of persons or a particular person
could be excluded, because the group or individual held particular
religious beliefs that created a great danger of unconstitutional
behavior. It will be recalled that the Supreme Court in the
132
Witherspoon-Witt line of cases relating to capital punishment, held
qualify them as such because of the Establishment Clause. Might they be a
cognizable group by virtue of their knowledge of farming and related rural activities?
But would they know things that non-Amish farmers do not? Might the Amish be a
specially protected class under the Equal Protection Clause? Might the free exercise
rights of the Amish be violated by the use in forming jury pools of lists of those who
engage in activities the Amish religion forbids them to engage in, even though the
use of these lists was not for the purpose of excluding them?
132
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
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that jurors whose beliefs would substantially impair their ability to
consider the evidence and apply the law could be excluded from the
jury for cause.
Presumably this would include jurors whose
133
opposition was based on religious belief.
In extreme cases, the
Establishment Clause might require, not simply permit, a person or
class of persons to be excluded. Thus, in certain situations the
ordinary law of exclusion for cause might not measure up to
constitutional requirements.
134
Miles v. United States
involved the question of whether
Mormons who believed in bigamy could be disqualified for cause in
the trial of a prosecution for bigamy. The Supreme Court’s decision
was handed down shortly after its ruling in the famous case of
Reynolds v. United States, in which a criminal conviction for practicing
135
bigamy was held not to violate the Free Exercise Clause. The trial
court had disqualified two jurors, one who said he believed that
bigamy was an ordinance of God and that persons who practiced it
should not be convicted, and another who said he also believed that
bigamy was an ordinance of God and that the statute that prohibited
it was in conflict with that ordinance, but that Congress had a right to
pass such a law and that he would consider it his duty, if satisfied by
136
the evidence, to find the defendant guilty.
The Supreme Court
sustained both of the lower court’s rulings and did so in sweeping
language suggesting that the mere holding of a belief that bigamy was
an ordinance of God justified exclusion for cause and that the fact
137
that religious belief was involved was irrelevant. It seems clear that
an expressed intention to use the position of juror to defeat the law
warrants exclusion for cause even though the motivation is religious.
As to the second juror in Miles, who said he believed in polygamy but
would do his civic duty nevertheless, there may be more question.
Might there be a conflict here with the Witherspoon-Witt line of cases,
which held that jurors who had some scruples about capital
punishment could not be excluded for cause? Of course those
decisions addressed the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
random selection from a fair cross-section. In Miles it is not clear
whether the Court intended to address such a claim. It did, however,
(1968).
133
See State v. Davis, 386 S.E.2d 418, 427 (N.C. 1989) (holding exclusion for cause
of juror opposed to capital punishment on religious grounds was not violative of free
exercise rights); State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tenn. 1987) (same).
134
103 U.S. 304 (1880).
135
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
136
Miles, 103 U.S. at 306-07.
137
Id. at 310.
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expressly reject the contention that the free exercise rights of the
excluded juror had been violated, even though possibly there was
only a modest likelihood that the second juror would engage in
misconduct. Miles, however, like Reynolds, is an old decision, handed
down long before the modern development of free exercise
138
jurisprudence, and so without much authority.
Earlier it was said that McDaniel suggested two questions
pertinent to our subject, first, the relevance of exclusion from the
legislature to exclusion from a jury, and second, the relevance of
exclusion for cause to exclusion by peremptory challenge. I now
address the second question. In the case of challenges for cause, the
parties invoke a rule of law based upon the law’s judgment of an
unacceptable risk of misconduct. The number of challenges for
cause that may be upheld is unlimited. In the case of peremptories,
there is no rule of law except that the party’s decision must be
honored. The party makes an entirely discretionary determination,
on the basis of the information he has, about what is an unacceptable
risk of misconduct or how best his interests will be served. The
number of peremptories is limited. Thus peremptory challenges
have a different structure and serve different purposes than
challenges for cause. Obviously if a challenge for cause would be
sustained, a fortiori a peremptory challenge must be. It does not
follow, however, that if a challenge for cause would not be sustained,
a peremptory is not permissible. As applied to the question of
present concern, even if it is settled that under certain circumstances
the free exercise rights of the juror would block a challenge for
cause, that does not mean that a peremptory challenge must be
prohibited.
A return to the Witherspoon-Witt line of capital punishment cases
provides an opportunity to summarize what has just been said and to
situate it in the larger picture. As will be recalled, under WitherspoonWitt, jurors whose attitude toward capital punishment creates a
substantial risk that they will not apply the law or heed the evidence
may be excluded for cause. Their exclusion does not violate the fair
cross-section value of the Sixth Amendment; indeed, it can be argued
that it enforces it because of the high probability of misconduct.
138

Reynolds also involved challenges to jurors, but the challenges were based upon
the excluded jurors themselves being polygamists, not simply on their holding
opinions about polygamy. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 157. Compare Miles, 103 U.S. 304, with
Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951, 953-54 (D.C. 1977) (in prosecution for
robbery of priests in Catholic rectory, holding it was not error to refuse to exclude
for cause all Catholics). If “Catholics” could be excluded, who would fall within the
excluded class?
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These cases did not present a free exercise claim, but even if they
had, it probably would have been overridden by the compelling state
interest in preventing nullification of the law, even though the
interest in the free exercise of religion and the fair cross-section value
of the Sixth Amendment may not be of exactly the same weight. On
the other hand, under Witherspoon-Witt, jurors who are merely
doubtful about capital punishment may not be excluded for cause.
The risk of misconduct is not sufficient to justify encroachment upon
the fair cross-section value. This was the holding of Witherspoon itself.
Because the decision rested upon the Sixth Amendment, there was
no reason to reach a free exercise claim that might have been made
by jurors whose doubts had their origins in religious belief.
Although a juror merely doubtful about capital punishment may
not be excluded for cause, he may be excluded by a peremptory. The
characteristics of the peremptory challenge that have been outlined
above, which distinguish it from the challenge for cause, are enough
to justify such compromising of the cross-section value as may occur.
In making this point, it is assumed that the doubting jurors are a
cognizable group for Sixth Amendment purposes. Suppose now, in
addition, doubting jurors whose doubts rest upon religious belief
invoke their free exercise right with the purpose of preventing their
exclusion by peremptories. This right does not require that they
represent a cognizable group under the Sixth Amendment. They
claim that even though the virtues of a peremptory challenge are
enough to outweigh the Sixth Amendment value, these virtues are
not enough to outweigh the interest in the free exercise of religion.
It is now necessary to review what has been said and to take a
position on the permissibility of religion-based peremptories under
the Free Exercise Clause, assuming that the Sherbert-Yoder test is
applicable. Undoubtedly, exclusion from a jury on account of
religion imposes a burden on the practice of religion. The strength
of the First Amendment right not to have the practice of religion
burdened is indicated by the Sherbert-Yoder requirement of a
compelling state interest. Do the policies that support the allowance
of peremptory challenges constitute such an interest? These policies
have already been set forth: eliminating from the jury persons who
pose a risk of misconduct, although not a sufficient risk to support a
challenge for cause; allowing the parties to excuse a limited number
of jurors whom they consider unfavorably disposed towards them;
and allowing the parties to participate in the formation of the
tribunal, so as to make acceptance of the verdict more likely. That
there is no federal constitutional right to any peremptories at all does
not mean that if the legislature chooses to allow peremptories, the
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reasons for them do not add up to a substantial state interest.
In the case of race, the reasons for peremptories do not add up
to a state interest weighty enough to justify excluding a juror on that
basis. How then could they be found sufficient to constitute a
compelling state interest that would overcome the right to the free
exercise of religion? One might argue that a reason for reaching
different results in the two situations is not that there is any
difference in the policies supporting peremptories, but that the
substantive constitutional rights have different importance: the
constitutional commitment to abolish racial discrimination is
139
stronger than the commitment to the free exercise of religion. Put
thus baldly, the proposition is impossible to accept.
If it is argued that the effect of Smith has been to devalue the
right to the free exercise of religion with the consequence that it
should be given less protection than the right to be free from racial
discrimination, that would implicitly abolish the exceptions to the
Smith rule, under one of which—individualized consideration—it has
been assumed peremptory challenges should be located.
Even if ending racial discrimination is of supreme importance,
how can allowing religion-based peremptories be squared with not
allowing peremptories based on sex under the Equal Protection
Clause? Discrimination based on sex requires not a compelling, but
only a very persuasive state interest to justify it. Yet in J.E.B., the
Court held that the policies supporting peremptories did not even
140
reach that mark.
Surely it will not be argued that though the
strength of the policies for peremptories remains the same, the
substantive right to be free from sex discrimination is more powerful
than the right to the free exercise of religion, a right expressly set
forth in the First Amendment. The ideas about sex discrimination in
J.E.B. are relatively recent developments in equal protection law,
whereas the struggle over race discrimination has marked the
nation’s entire history, and since the Civil War has generated the
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Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127; id. at 146-47 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The State’s
proferred justifications for its gender-based peremptory challenges are far from the
‘exceedingly persuasive’ showing required to sustain a gender-based classification.”);
see Casarez, 913 S.W.2d at 502 (Baird, J., dissenting) (pointing out the difficulty of
reconciling the court’s decision in that case with J.E.B.); see also Hodge, 726 A.2d at
552 (finding J.E.B. not distinguishable); Angela J. Mason, Note, Discrimination Based
on Religious Affiliation: Another Nail in the Peremptory Challenge’s Coffin?, 29 GA. L. REV.
493, 523-25 (1995) (stating that in view of decisions regarding race and sex, the
Court has little choice but to disallow peremptory challenges based on religion); Arp,
supra note 110, at 738-39 (same). But see Chambers, supra note 5, at 592-99.
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strongest legal condemnations.
I have already pointed out a feature of peremptory challenges
based on religion that distinguishes them from challenges based on
race and sex. Whereas it is tolerably clear what is meant by a juror’s
race or sex, it is not at all clear what is meant by a juror’s religion.
The significance of this difference lies in its bearing on the predictive
value for juror misconduct or unfavorableness of the fact upon which
the challenge is premised: organizational affiliation may have little
predictive value, but regular attendance at worship or personal
statements of belief may have considerable. This consideration does
not alter the importance attached to the policies that support
peremptories, but it points to circumstances that affect the degree to
which those policies will be defeated by the disallowance of a
peremptory. If it is assumed, however, that the predictive value of the
fact concerning religion is the same as the predictive value of race or
sex, how can a peremptory challenge based on sex be disallowed, but
a peremptory challenge based on religion allowed, without holding
that the right to free exercise is less weighty than the right to be free
from sex discrimination?
In the foregoing I have been comparing the importance of the
right of free exercise with the rights to be free from racial and sexual
discrimination, and asking how the latter can be recognized but not
the former. But there is another perspective that must be taken into
account before closing, a perspective characteristically associated with
the Religion Clauses and which has been referred to already several
times in this Article: the standard embodied in the Religion Clauses
regarding the permissible relative effect of government action on the
positions of religion and nonreligion. It is one thing to consider
separately and then compare the strength of the rights to be free
from racial and sexual discrimination and the right to religious
freedom and to weigh these against the arguments in favor of
peremptories. But it has been settled by the Court that the
Constitution forbids peremptories based on race and sex. Even
assuming that the Free Exercise Clause allows religion-based
peremptories in cases where all other peremptories are allowed, since
the Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the use
of some nonreligion-based peremptories—race and sex—then
141

See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 155 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (distinguishing
disallowance of racial from sexual peremptories, in part on ground that “racial
equality has proved a more challenging goal to achieve on many fronts than gender
equality”); Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting in denial
of certiorari) (contending that the decision in J.E.B. requires disallowance of
religion-based peremptories).
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perhaps the norm embodied in the Religion Clauses, which says that
if certain advantages are given to nonreligion they must also be given
to religion, requires that religion-based peremptories be disallowed.
The Court has given us an equal protection jurisprudence that is not
“neutral [and] generally applicable,” with the consequence that the
Free Exercise Clause, read against this background, requires that
142
religion be similarly protected.
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If religion-based peremptories are held to be constitutionally impermissible,
what of those based upon expressions of political opinion or other speech, or upon
membership in nonreligious associations? United States v. Villareal, 963 F.2d 725, 72829 (5th Cir. 1992), a pre J.E.B. case, refused to disallow such peremptories. (The
juror had made statements indicating opposition to capital punishment.) See Casarez,
913 S.W.2d at 492, 495; id. at 498 (Mansfield, J., concurring) (expressing concern
with the implications of disallowing religion-based peremptories for the status of
peremptories based on political speech and association); see also Cheryl G. Bader,
Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory Challenges That Violate a
Prospective Juror’s Speech and Association Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567 (1996).

